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Dynamic leaders and great battles tend to dominate the study of military history.  But 
operational concepts nest tactics and contain the techniques that military leaders use to 
achieve success in combat.  Once developed, operational concepts and their supporting tactics 
are refined by each successive generation and become that countries way of war. This thesis 
focuses on the development of operational concepts during the trench warfare period of the 
Korean War (June 1951 – July 1953) and proposes that these operational concepts were the 
foundation of the operational concepts the U.S. Army employed for the rest of the Cold War.         
        The operational concepts of the Korean War trench warfare period emerged because of 
factors removed from the Korean battlefield.  These factors, primarily atomic weapons and 
the perceived strength of the U.S.S.R., forced Eighth Army commanders to develop new 
operational concepts when they faced an unexpected situation.  Instead of prosecuting an 
offensive maneuver war prosecuted through battles of annihilation, similar to the first year of 
the war, Generals Matthew B. Ridgway, James A. Van Fleet, Mark W. Clark, and Maxwell 
D. Taylor were ordered to fight a defensive and limited war of attrition.   
        This thesis studies U.S. Army operational concepts developed during the Korean War 
trench warfare period and their effect on subsequent U.S. Army doctrine, equipment, and 
training, to wage Cold War.  The five interrelated operational concepts explored in this thesis 
include Small Unit Tactics (SUT), precision fire support, special operations, combined 
operations, and the development of Foreign Internal Defense (FID) as a valid force 
multiplier, through the development of the Republic of Korea Armed Forces.  These five 
operational concepts bundled U.S. Army concepts that traditionally supported offensive 
warfare and instead they became the main effort during the defensive and limited war of 
attrition in Korea.  These operational concepts were a clear departure from those the Army 
employed during WWII.  Their influence was long lasting, reflected in their current place in 
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U.S. Army doctrine, Unified Land Operations that includes a heavy emphasis on defensive 
and stability operations and now includes wide area security as an Army core competency 
equal to combined arms maneuver.  
        Through the study of these five operational concepts and their development over the two 
years of the Korean War trench warfare period it became clear that the options available to 
U.S. ground commanders were extremely circumscribed, forcing them to do things 
differently.  That something different was to bundle minor tactics into new operational 
concepts. This fused five operational concepts into a coherent battle doctrine designed to 
achieve the strategic goals of the U.S. and its allies: to sign an armistice and frustrate the 
Communist aim to destroy the ROK.  This thesis defines five operational concepts that the 
U.S. Army developed and effectively used to force the communists to sign an armistice.  
These five concepts remain a crucial component of how the U.S. Army fights but not always 

























War is nothing but the continuation of policy with other means. 
-Carl Von Clausewitz, 10 July 1827
1
 
The final two years of the Korean War was a period of static and defensive attritional 
warfare.  From June 1951 through August 1953, the U.S. Army developed operational 
concepts designed to achieve defensive attritional goals in a limited war.  This change in 
operational concepts constituted the U.S. Army’s adjustment to the U.S. government’s 
national strategy of Containment.  This enforced period of static defensive attritional warfare 
forced the U.S. Army to adjust its operational concepts in order to employ tactics to fight in a 
defensive strategic paradigm.   
        During this static period, the U.S. Army experimented with and developed various 
operational concepts to counter Chinese communist advantages in manpower and initiative.  
These operational concepts allowed the U.S. Army to retain a tactically offensive focus while 
conducting an operational attritional and strategically defensive conflict in Korea.  General 
Matthew B. Ridgway stated, “I constantly reminded the field commanders of our essential 
aim – to deal out maximum damage at minimum cost.”2  Gaining ground did not support the 
strategic and operational goals of the U.S. government.  General Ridgway, upon assuming 
command of all United Nations (U.N.) forces in April 1951, wrote a letter of instruction to all 
his commanders stating: “You will direct the efforts of your forces toward inflicting 
maximum personnel casualties and materiel losses on hostile forces in Korea… Acquisition 
of terrain in itself is of little or no value.
3”  
        To kill more effectively in Korea, the U.S. Army developed five operational concepts.  It 
improved Small Unit Tactics (SUT) at the regimental level and below and built effective 
infantry teams.  Commanders integrated land and air based firepower into a coherent, 
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responsive and effective precision fire support (FS) system. The U.S. Army developed and 
employed special operations capabilities designed to counter communist insurgency tactics.  
The Army also improved its ability to lead a coalition.  And the Eighth Army through the 
Korean Military Advisory Group (KMAG) improved the capability and capacity of the 
Republic of Korea Army (ROKA) using Foreign Internal Defense (FID) concepts.  This 
allowed the ROKA to fight as an equal and take responsibility for defending the Republic of 
Korea (ROK).     
        By applying these five operational concepts, the U.S. Army adapted to the defensive 
national strategy of Containment, as well as the operational concepts used by the Chinese 
Peoples Volunteers Force (CPVF) and the Korean People’s Army (KPA).  The communist 
forces, according to Walter Hermes, “had over twice as many battalions in Korea as the UNC 
had and a considerable edge in the number of guns as well.”4  With these advantages and a 
more offensive strategy, the communist forces maintained the initiative along the Main Line 
of Resistance (MLR) throughout the trench warfare period.  
        Even with these advantages, after the summer of 1951, Eighth Army limited the ability 
of communist forces to conducting offensive operations along the MLR.  Communist leaders 
decided when to focus on the peace process and when to fight over hilltops forward of the 
MLR. U.S. leaders took a long time to appreciate that communist leaders would sacrifice men 
on fights over hill tops for the perceived strategic advantage.  After the armistice Ridgway 
mused, “Perhaps we should have foreseen that, in Communist style, they would consider 
these people expendable, and of value only to the extent that they might contribute to the 
final triumph of Communism.”5  The battle of Boulder City, 24-27 July 1953, exemplified the 
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willingness of communist leaders to expend men in a test of wills the very day the armistice 
went into effect, on 27 July 1953.
6
    
        This strategically defensive, operationally attritional, international limited conflict 
waged under the banner of the U.N., was an event that lacked clarity, or even a name.  The 
Korean War, the Forgotten War, Truman’s Police Action, or the War to Resist America and 
Aid Korea are some of the names used to refer to the events that occurred on the Korean 
Peninsula from 25
 
June 1950 through 27
 
July 1953.  The inability to agree on appropriate 
terminology is attributed to the Korean War being something new and disturbing that did not 
fit into the understanding of many Americans.  This conflict was a hybrid.  The Korean War 
combined a war of national unification with a proxy war between the U.S. and the Soviet 
Union, in which both super powers limited the scope and objectives of their forces.  Unlike 
the totality of WWII, this was a limited war.   
        In the late 1940’s, the Korean Peninsula was one of several places around the globe 
where the U.S. and Soviet Union were in conflict and supported different proxies.  For the 
U.S. and its U.N. allies, the fighting in Korea was a peripheral, limited, defensive and 
attritional conflict.  Clausewitz defined defensive limited war in the following terms: “The 
defender’s purpose…is to keep his territory inviolate, and to hold it for as long as possible.  
That will gain him time, and gaining time is the only way he achieve[s] his aim.”7   
        The reality of this type of war clashed with the traditional U.S. view of warfare held by 
most Americans.  This American view of war was best articulated by General of the Army 
Douglas MacArthur, who defined the goal of warfare as “Victory, immediate and complete!”8  
Paraphrasing MacArthur’s understanding of the American attitude toward war, General 
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Ridgway wrote, “Americans are not inclined by temperament to fight limited wars… it would 
be like standing up for sin against virtue.”9 
        Presidents Harry S. Truman and Dwight D. Eisenhower viewed Korea and East Asia as 
a distraction from the major theater of Cold War struggle: Europe.
10
  But the Korean War 
stood out then and now as the only place where the U.S., Soviet Union, Peoples Republic of 
China (PRC) and their allies engaged in direct armed conflict.  Despite every major and many 
minor powers involvement, neither side wanted to escalate the conflict.   
        General Omar N. Bradley, when testifying to the U.S. Senate, on the administration’s 
decisions with respect to the PRC and their involvement in Korea, stated that to expand the 
conflict in Korea to a greater war with the PRC was: “[T]he wrong war, at the wrong place, 
at the wrong time, and with the wrong enemy.”11 U.S. strategy of containment was focused 
on rebuilding Europe and Japan and not fighting a land war in Asia against the Chinese.
12
 
The USSR was viewed as the leader of global communism and the focus of U.S. efforts. 
        The Korean War brought into question U.S. Army principles.  It questioned the way the 
U.S government, and specifically the U.S. Army, planned for, trained for, and fought wars.  
In 1950, the U.S. Army planned to fight the next war based on its experiences during WWII.  
These plans and the principles of war behind them were influenced by classical military 
theorists such as nineteenth-century Carl Von Clausewitz and Antoine-Henri Jomini.
13
  FM 
100-5 Operations (1949), the U.S. Army’s primary doctrinal manual, defined war in a way 
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similar to Clausewitz’s definition: “Force…is thus the means of war; to impose our will on 
the enemy is its object. To secure that object we must render the enemy powerless; and that, 
in theory, is the true aim of warfare.”14 
        Two of the U.S. Army’s Principles of War were “The Objective” and “The Offensive.”  
These were two of the nine U.S. Army Principles of War found in Field Manual 100-5 
Operations (1949).
15
  This manual defined U.S. Army operational concepts before the 
Korean War and through the first year of fighting.  FM 100-5 Operations (1949) stated:  
The Objective: The ultimate objective of all military operations is the 
destruction of the enemy’s armed forces and his will to fight. The selection of 
intermediate objectives whose attainment contributes most decisively and 
quickly to the accomplishment of the ultimate objective at the least cost, 
human and material, must be based on as complete as possible knowledge of 
the enemy and theater of operations.
16
   
 
 FM 100-5 Operations (1949) reinforced “The Objective” with the principal of “The 
Offensive:”  
The Offensive: Through offensive action, a commander preserves his freedom 
of action and imposes his will on the enemy.  The selection by the commander 
of the right time and place for offensive action is a decisive factor in the 
success of the operation…a defensive should be deliberately adopted only as a 





Americans viewed war as the last tool of statecraft, and if war was declared, the nation should 
fight with all its might to end the conflict as quickly as possible.
18
 According to FM 100-5 
Operations (1949), war would and should be fought in a rapid, decisive and total manner 
using all weapons at the U.S. Army’s disposal.19  FM 100-5 Operations (1949) articulated 
General Bradley’s views on how the U.S. Army should fight future wars. The operational 
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concepts in the field manual were the distilled lessons from WWII and represented a doctrine 
the U.S. Army could use in future combat.  FM 100-5 Operations (1949) was premised on an 
offensive strategy focused on maneuver, designed to annihilate the designated enemy, and 
occupy their key terrain. 
        The U.S. Army prepared for war with the goal of forcing unconditional surrender on its 
enemies.  This strategy was based on U.S. history and drew clear goals for the Army.
20
  
Unconditional surrender, as articulated by President Franklin Delano Roosevelt during 
WWII, allowed the U.S. Army to focus all its effort to achieve a clear military goal.  This 
clarity allowed the Army to employ its complete panoply of military might against an 
enemy.
21
  These direct and clear cut concepts were designed to support a specific offensive 
national strategy.  U.S. doctrine did not consider that changes in military technology, like the 
atomic bomb, could force radical changes in national strategy.  But in retrospect the change 
began on 6 and 9 August 1945, when the U.S. employed atomic weapons to end WWII in the 
Pacific.  The world changed again on 29 August 1949 (coincidently, the month the U.S. 
Army published FM 100-5 Operations (1949)) when the Soviet Union detonated its first 
atomic device, and became the second atomic state.  
        These factors concerned U.S. strategists in the Truman administration, at a time when 
the capabilities and intentions of the Soviet Union remained problematic.
22
  In late 1949 and 
early 1950 a small group of senior State and Defense Department officials prepared an 
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important document, NSC 68, delivered to President Truman on 7 April 1950.
23
  This 
National Security Council (NSC) document outlined four courses of action to deal with the 
Soviet Union.  Before it even arrived on Truman’s desk, the policy and security leadership 
agreed on the fourth course of action.  The documents official title – NSC 68: United States 
Objectives and Programs for National Security (14 April 1950) – was designed to avoid 
offending any part of the U.S government.   NSC 68 designed a national strategy, 
Containment, to defeat the Soviet Union and its satellites, because they objected to the U.S. 
world system envisioned in the U.N. Charter.  
        NSC 68’s four courses of action included: 
a. Continuation of current policies, with current and currently projected programs for 
carrying out these projects (the status quo Truman Doctrine); b. Isolation; c. War; and   
d. A more rapid building up of the political, economic, and military strength of the free 
world than provided under (a), with the purpose of reaching, if possible, a tolerable state 
of order among nations without war and of preparing to defend ourselves in the event that 




        The authors of the document, primarily Paul H. Nitze, Director of the State Department 
Policy Planning Staff, believed that current government policies were not enough to stop the 
Soviet Union.  He and the core of the NSC staff viewed the fourth option as necessary to 
preserve the victory of WWII and the goals outlined in the U.N. Charter.
25
  Truman, in 
contrast, preferred the current policies as outlined in the first option.
26
  Truman’s assessment 
was that the Soviet threat was overblown and he proposed cutting defense spending from 
$14.3 billion to $13.5 billion for fiscal year 1951.
27
  He thought that NATO, limited military 
aid, an atomic deterrent and the Marshall Plan was enough to stop Joseph Stalin and the 
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Soviet Union’s design.28  Truman believed that his anti-Communist policies would stop the 
designs of the Soviet Union; the authors of NSC 68 disagreed.   
        In April 1950, Truman tabled NSC 68 and asked for additional analysis directly from 
members of his cabinet who supported additional military cuts.  Ernest May defined the 
situation Truman faced in May 1950: “In the face of a united bureaucracy warning that the 
world risked enslavement, a president already under attack from the right could not afford 
simply to do nothing.”29  NSC 68 and U.S. national strategy remained at a crossroad.   
        But Truman’s thinking changed after 25 June 1950, when Soviet trained, advised and 
equipped Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) forces crossed the 38th parallel in 
T-34 tanks and invaded the Republic of Korea (ROK).
30
  This action by the KPA abrogated 
the U.N. created diplomatic system designed to deal with the contested sovereignty on the 
Korean peninsula.
31
  The KPA invasion posed a challenge to the U.S., and its commitment to 
collective security. This provoked the commitment of U.S. forces in Korea.
32
 
        On 30 September 1950, after two months of war, President Truman approved NSC 68, 
and it became U.S. national strategy.
33
  Though modified by successive U.S. presidents, 
“NSC 68 laid out the rationale for U.S. strategy during much of the Cold War.”34  This 
strategy required a supporting defensive military strategy, in direct contradiction to the U.S. 
Army’s WWII thinking.  U.S. Army officer and historian T.R. Fehrenbach wrote, “[The 
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Eisenhower administration] would, after a year or two, adopt Containment, and continue 
virtually unchanged, every foreign policy of the Truman Administration.”35  This strategy 
was more complicated and far reaching than just the simple military Containment of the 
Soviet Union and other communist states.  
        The center piece of the Containment strategy was:   
The frustration of the Kremlin design requires the free world to develop a 
successfully functioning political and economic system and a vigorous 
political offensive against the Soviet Union. These, in turn, require an 
adequate military shield under which they can develop. It is necessary to have 
the military power to deter, if possible, Soviet expansion, and to defeat, if 





NSC 68 describes the military as a defensive shield.  Furthermore, it describes politics and 
economics as the offensive agents of this strategy.  The U.S. and free world forces would act 
as the shield to protect the development of the free world political and economic system.  In 
1950 the free world included the British Commonwealth, North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO) members, and nations aligned with the U.S. against communism.  
        The strength of the free world’s economic and political system would act as NSC 68’s 
offensive capability.  Free world political and economic systems were the sword pointed at 
the ideological heart of the communist political and economic system.  This new militarily 
defensive strategy stood in direct opposition to the U.S. Army role stated in FM 100-5 
Operations (1949) and the Joint Chiefs of Staff Operations Plan Offtackle prior to the Korean 
War.
37
  The U.S. Army viewed its role as the nation’s sword designed to annihilate enemies, 
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not as the shield of freedom defensively holding the line against Communist infiltration on 
the frontier of the free world.   
        NSC 68 articulated a new way of war where victory was defined as an enemy forced to 
conform “with the purposes and principles set forth in the U.N. Charter.”38  This Cold War 
strategy would require a conflict of undetermined length to break the political and economic 
will of the Soviets.  With Truman’s September 1950 adoption of NSC 68, the U.S. Army was 
required to support redefined U.S. government non-military objectives.  Instead of focusing 
on breaking an enemy’s military will to resist after a declaration of war, future military 
struggle would support the greater political and economic struggle between the free world 
and communist systems.  NSC 68 stated: 
The only sure victory lies in the frustration of the Kremlin design by the 
steady development of the moral and material strength of the free world and 
its projection into the Soviet world in such a way as to bring about an internal 




        The operational design to execute a defensive long term national strategy required the 
free world to hold Western Europe, Africa, the Middle East, Western Pacific, and Japan while 
preventing further Soviet expansion.  This required a different conception of military conflict.  
Into this strategic policy debate, the Korean War rudely interjected the reality of 
“Containment.”  The Korean War drew up a “butcher’s bill” (cost of the policy in terms of 
human lives and material) of requirements in “blood and treasure.”  The cost of Containment 
in Korea was not cheap. In terms of “blood” it would cost the U.S. and its allies several 
hundred thousand military casualties (a combination of wounded and dead, mostly South 
Koreans).
40
  In terms of “treasure” the estimated total cost Walter Hermes cites is $83 billion 
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as calculated by Raymond E. Manning for the Library of Congress, Legislative Reference 
Service, 1956.
 41
  This was the cost of Containment; to use “military power to 
deter…aggressive Soviet or Soviet-directed actions of a limited or total character.”42   
        Containment policy articulated in NSC 68 stated:  
“In “Containment” it is desirable to exert pressure in a fashion which will 
avoid so far as possible directly challenging Soviet prestige, to keep open the 
possibility for the [Soviet Union] to retreat before pressure with a minimum 
loss of face and to secure political advantage from the failure of the Kremlin to 
yield or take advantage of the openings we leave it.” 
 
        Despite the strategic shift articulated in NSC 68 “Containment Strategy,” however, the 
essence of the Korean War turned out to be ground combat.
43
  The last day of the Korean 
War saw one of the most immense exchanges of fire power between the two forces.
44
  After 
three years of fighting the Chinese and Korean communists,
45
 much of it brutal and hand-to-
hand, the U.S. Army officially claimed there were no important lessons learned during the 
three years of combat in Korea.
46
  Robert A. Doughty wrote in his review of Korean War 
doctrine, “[A] special bulletin from the Army Field Forces originally entitled “Lessons 
Learned” was soon re-titled “Training Bulletin.”47  However the drastic Army reforms of the 
1950s, development of new equipment, and the rewriting of U.S. Army Field Manuals 
demonstrate the opposite. 
        This thesis connects global conditions and the Containment strategy to the U.S. Army 
development of operational concepts during the Korean War.  Both WWII and Viet Nam 
dominate the historical study of 20
th
 Century American warfare in ways dissimilar to the 
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study of the Korean War.  This thesis argues that the Korean War inherited WWII operational 
concepts, changed them to adapt to a defensive attritional condition, and these changes   
shaped how the U.S. Army went on to approach the Cold War.  The Korean War was the 
U.S. Army’s first limited war fought under a defensive military strategy using attrition to 
achieve U.S. national goals.  The Army developed operational concepts to adapt to the 
limited U.S. military goals outlined in the national Containment strategy and the challenge 
presented by the Chinese Communist enemy they fought.  
       Chapter Two examines the conditions and environment that shaped the Korean War.  
The conditions in which the U.S. and its remaining allies found themselves in 1950 were 
different than those imagined in the fall of 1945.  These conditions were starker and more 
confrontational than expected after the end of WWII, and included the rapid development of 
a Soviet atomic capability and a divided U.N.  The passage of the National Security Act of 
1947 changed the structure of the U.S. defense and foreign policy establishment.  This 
organizational change affected the way the U.S. government conducted its external and 
internal operations and demoted the U.S. Army from the head of the War Department to one 
of many equals within the U.S. government security apparatus.    
        The formulation of U.S. policy within this new military-political framework created a 
different type of U.S. grand strategy.  The disintegration of the WWII alliance focused the 
National Security Council (NSC) on the transition of the Soviet Union from ally to enemy, 
and the spread of communism and communist inspired revolutions.  The theoretical 
disconnect between the strategy articulated in NSC-68 and the operational concepts outlined 
in FM 100-5 Operations (1949) created a gap between U.S. national strategy and the 
operational concepts the U.S. Army planned to use when the Korean War broke out.  
        This gap is best understood using the strategic – operational – tactical cross walk, to 
match the desired strategic goals articulated by the Truman doctrine and NSC 68, to potential 
13 
 
and actual operations desired, and the tactical capacity and capabilities of the U.S. Army.  
Conservative U.S. Army doctrine, as codified in the U.S. Army keystone manual, FM 100-5 
Operations (1949), was written prior to the Korean War and adoption of NSC 68.  This 
keystone manual focused on a military repetition of WWII.
48
  Starting with V-E and V-J Day 
U.S. forces in the field dealt with shortages and conducted missions similar to containment.  
In Greece, China, Viet Nam, the Philippines, Korea, and Germany, U.S. Army soldiers 
grappled with containing communist aggression with inadequate doctrinal or institutional 
support.
49
  Within this institutional transition the U.S. Army was thrust into the Korean War, 
which it eventually fought within the constraints of the Containment strategy.  Because of the 
change in U.S. strategic objectives in early 1951, the U.S. Army had to change its operational 
concepts while fighting a revolutionary Chinese foe.  
        Chapter Three focuses on Communist tactics and the two critical ingredients necessary 
to wage modern war: men and material.  During the Korean War, U.S. forces expended vast 
quantities of material but harbored their manpower.  This dynamic expenditure of steel in the 
effort to reduce casualties reached its peak during the trench warfare period of the war, June 
1951–July 1953.   
        From July 1950 until May 1951 the U.S. Army employed operational maneuver in 
accordance with FM 100-5 Operations (1949), focused on offensive operations and battles of 
annihilation. The larger strategic picture, outside the Korean Theater of Operations (KTO), 
was fluid and changed from month to month.  The greatest operational challenge during this 
period was the introduction of communist Chinese infantry formations into the conflict.   
        The development of U.S. soldiers and their equipment played a major role during the 
trench warfare period that ensued.  During the Korean War the U.S. Army experimented with 
individual instead of unit based rotation policies.  The majority of the new units created 
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during the Korean War were sent to garrison Europe or the United States.   During the 
conflict, the U.S. Army also learned how to maximize the use of its equipment beyond design 
specifications.  Experimentation, adoption, and better employment of military equipment 
became an essential part of the Korean conflict.  This included the introduction of modified 
and new tanks, new fire support systems and procedures, new personal support equipment, 
and other experimental technologies such as helicopters and armored personel carriers, all of 
which supported the change in operational concepts to adapt to a defensive attritional 
battlefield against a revolutionary Chinese enemy.  
        Chapter Four and Five focus on the operational concepts developed during the trench 
warfare period, 1951-1953.  These operational concepts were developed to employ the 
manpower and equipment available to the U.S. Army to achieve the strategic defensive goals 
through attrition of the enemy.  To fight against a tenacious Chinese communist enemy, 
under the specter of Soviet intervention, and the constraints of Containment, the U.S. Army 
employed five operational concepts.  Chapter Four breaks down the three concepts internal to 
the U.S. Army while Chapter Five deals with the two concepts that involved the Army 
working with allies and the Koreans.   
        The three operational concepts that involved internal U.S. Army changes during the 
Korean War were small unit tactics, responsive precision fire support, and the employment of 
special operations.  The two other operational concepts involved the way the U.S. Army 
would lead coalition operations and build local armies.  In no document, manual, or book 
does it state that these were the five operational concepts that achieved U.S. military goals 
during the Korean War.  Nor were these concepts ever coherently adopted in any one 
document after the war or taught at U.S. Army schools.  Instead, the U.S. Army adopted 
many of these changes through the adoption of updated versions of FM 100-5 (1954) and 
other supporting manuals, specifically the various revision of the Infantry series of manuals. 
15 
 
Nevertheless, these five operational concepts were manifested through the decisions, 
missions, and doctrine that developed during and after the Korean War.  These five 
operational concepts allowed the U.S. Army to remain tactically offensive while achieving 
strategically defensive goals.  
        The sixth chapter of the work is its conclusion. It explains how this thesis places the 
Korean War and its operational concepts in the perspective of an unfinished conflict unique 
in history.  It was the one conflict where the nations of the Free World directly fought the 
PRC backed by the Soviet Union.  It was a conflict where the final U.S./U.N. goal was not to 
liberate enemy territory but to maintain the status quo and convince the enemy to stop 
fighting.  The battles in the hills of Korea along the 38
th
 parallel trained a generation of 
American officers in the art of soldiering, stripped of glamour and revolutionary operational 
concepts.  
        Since the signing of the armistice in 1953, one-year unaccompanied tours in Korea, 
north of the no smile line,
50
 trained fifty years’ worth of soldiers and officers in the same 
soldiering arts. Each year new “turtles” would learn to adapt to the unforgiving Korean 
terrain and weather and learn to work with the hardy Korean people.
51
 The tactical lessons 
learned and re-learned fighting the CPVF and KPA along the 38
th
 parallel during the trench 
warfare period of the Korean War established the operational concepts that the U.S. Army 
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Literature Review  
…All of the heroism and all of the sacrifice, went unreported. So the very fine 
victory of Pork Chop Hill deserves the description of the Won-Lost Battle. It 
was won by the troops and lost to sight by the people who sent them forth 
 – S.L.A. Marshall, Pork Chop Hill 16-18 April 195352  
 
        Like the battle of Pork Chop Hill and heroism of the men that manned the MLR during 
the trench warfare period, the operational concepts developed and successfully employed 
were not embraced by the U.S. Army leadership as a desired model to contain communism.  
Similarly, analysis of operational concepts developed during the Korean War is an 
underdeveloped part of military history.  Part of the Cold War or post-WWII narrative the 
Korean War is rarely the focus, but instead usually an event in a long list of events that 
shaped the period before the Viet Nam War and after WWII.
53
  The Korean War is also 
downplayed as a factor in the study of longer term interaction between the states involved in 
it.  For example John King Fairbank’s work on U.S./Chinese relations, The United States and 
China, devotes only five pages to the period.  Wars tend to affect the way states interact in 
the future.  But not one word in Fairbank’s book deals with the interaction between the U.S. 
and China during the war or the lessons learned from the Korean War.
54
   
        In U.S. Army circles the Korean War is often referred to as a limited victory and Viet 
Nam as a loss.  In the 1963 work This Kind of War: A Study in Unpreparedness, T.R. 
Fehrenbach speculated that one can learn from losses but it is unclear what an army can learn 
from a tie?  After the armistice was signed, many asked what the Korean War accomplished, 
“Despite the claims of the enemy, there had been no victory… in Korea. At best the outcome 
could be called a draw.” 55  These thoughts are part of the historical and political reflections 
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about the Korean War but are tempered by the continued success of the Republic of Korea 
(ROK) in comparison to their cousins in the Democratic Peoples’ Republic of Korea 
(DPRK).  
        From the late 1980’s, the study of the Korean War expanded.  New interest spurred by 
the publication of memoirs, battle and unit studies, and declassified documents, brought 
greater clarity to Korean War scholarship.  An example is, The Darkest Summer by Bill Sloan 
that focused on the 1
st
 Provisional Marine Brigade and its actions during the battle for the 
Pusan Perimeter.  Sloan argues that the Marines performance in the Pusan perimeter and the 
Inchon landing saved the Marine Corps as a distinct organization within the U.S. Armed 
Forces.  A memoir of battle and of the prisoner of war (POW) experience is found in Valleys 
of Death by Colonel William Richardson and Kevin Maurer.
56
   
        A similar work, Forgotten Warriors, by T. X. Hammes, contributes to the history of the 
U.S. Marine Corps’ during the conflict and situates the Korean War within the Marine Corps’ 
narrative.
57
  In similar fashion, On Hallowed Ground by Bill McWilliams provides a detailed 
study of the valor and ingenuity demonstrated during the 6-12 June 1953 battle of Pork Chop 
Hill, one of the last battles of the war.
58
  Likewise, Lee Ballenger’s detailed two volume work 
on the Marine Corps’ during the trench warfare period adds detail and humanity to the 
actions of small units during the truce tent period.  Both The Outpost War and The Final 
Crucible demonstrate that both sides fought bitter battles up to the last day of the conflict.
59
  
At the heart of these detailed unit studies is a question: was the Korean War worth the 
sacrifice?  The common conclusion was that the war was fought poorly with great sacrifice in 
                                                          
56
 Bill Sloan, The Darkest Summer: Pusan and Inchon 1950: The battles that saved South Korea – and 
the Marines – from extinction (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2009); William Richardson with Kevin Maurer, 
Valleys of Death: Memoir of the Korean War (New York: Berkley Caliber, 2010). 
57
 Thomas X. Hammes, Forgotten Warriors: The 1
st
 Provisional Marine Brigade, The Corps Ethos, 
and The Korean War (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2010). 
58
 Bill McWilliams, On Hallowed Ground: The Last Battle for Pork Chop Hill (New York: Berkley 
Caliber Books, 2004). 
59
 Lee Ballenger, The Outpost War: U.S. Marines in Korea, Vol. 1: 1952 & The Final Crucible: U.S. 
Marines in Korea, Vol. 2: 1953 (Washington: Potomac Books, 2000 & 2001). 
18 
 
lives lost.  Yet, the cost was justified because it halted communism and gave the ROK the 
opportunity to become a free nation.  
        Some books focus on specific events or units that figured prominently in the Korean 
War.  Andrew Salmon’s To the Last Round is a good example.  Salmon’s detailed study of 
the British 29
th
 Infantry Brigade’s April 1951 battle along the Imjin River, known as the 
Battle for Gloster Hill, brings a new perspective and context to the Gloucestershire 
Regiment’s sacrifice.60  On Hill 235, the British Gloucestershire Regiment was destroyed 
while holding back the CPVF 63
rd
 Army.  The actions of the 29
th
 Brigade were credited with 
slowing Marshal Peng Dehuai’s Fifth Phase Offensive or Spring Offensive.  Salmon writes as 
a journalist historian focused on a story he felt was not fully told.  In telling the story of the 
29
th
 Brigade he argues that the British and other U.N. forces contributed more to the Korean 
War than is commonly understood.   
        Salmon’s and William Johnston’s A War of Patrols: Canadian Army Operations in 
Korea, add depth and detail to the Commonwealth contribution to the Korean War.  They 
also support the literature on the British, Canadian, Australian, New Zealand, South African, 
and Indian Commonwealth experience during the Korean War.  Johnson argues in his book 
that the first rotation of Canadians, the “Special Force,” was as good as the professional units 
that contributed to the second and third rotations of Canadian troops during the Korean War.  
He also argues that the British Commonwealth Division was better than the U.S. Army 
divisions and equal to the U.S. Marine Corps division in Korea.  This careful study of the 
contributions of Commonwealth forces during the conflict supports a broader understanding 
of the Korean War as a U.N. war against communist aggression.
61
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        Other writers attempted to encapsulate the entire Korean War in a single volume.  The 
most well-known is T.R. Fehrenbach’s This Kind of War: A Study in Unpreparedness now re-
titled, This Kind of War: The Classic Korean War History.
62
  Due to its high profile, the 
publisher changed the name when it was reprinted in 1994, to reflect its position within the 
field of Korean War studies.  Originally published in 1963, Fehrenbach’s central argument 
concerned the American people’s lack of understanding about the war in Korea and 
American delusions about the conduct of future wars.  He argued that the Containment 
strategy needed a new type of army, a professional army, trained and prepared to fight limited 
defensive attritional wars.  Fehrenbach stressed that the future of American warfare would 
consist of limited wars such as Korea and not global wars like WWII.   
        Two popular historians of WWII with wide readerships, Max Hastings and John Toland, 
contributed to the field of Korean War history in their separate works The Korean War and In 
Mortal Combat: Korea, 1950-1953.
63
  The iconic cover of Hastings work, depicting a shell 
shocked soldier, is one of the most recognized images associated with the Korean War.  
Hastings’ book, published in 1987, was influenced by revisionist studies of the Korean and 
Viet Nam Wars.  He concluded that the Korean War was misunderstood and poorly fought at 
all levels, but was a legitimate conflict fought for a valid reason that resulted in a free ROK.
64
  
Toland takes a similar view, but his book, written in 1991, right after the demise of the Soviet 
Union, concludes that “those who fought and died in that war did not fight and die in vain.”65   
        In contrast, two substantive official histories on the Korean War from an allied 
perspective were written by Robert O’Neill, Australia in the Korean War, 1950-53, Volume I: 
Strategy and Diplomacy and Volume II: Combat Operations and Anthony Farrar-Hockley 
Official History, The British Part in the Korean War, Volume I: A Distant Obligation and 
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Volume II: An Honourable Discharge.
66
 Both O’Neill and Farrar-Hockley give depth and 
perspective to a conflict dominated by the American and Korean perspective. Each author 
demonstrates the effort and commitment of the various U.N. contingents who performed acts 
of valor in defense of Korea equal and sometimes greater than their American and Korean 
comrades.  
        The most recent serious studies of the Korean War come from Allan R. Millett. Two 
volumes of his planned three volume work are currently in print, published in 2005 and 2010 
respectively, and the third is a work in progress. Dr. Millett, a colonel in the U.S. Marine 
Corps Reserve, is considered the dean of Korean War studies, because of his attention to 
detail and insightful use of new or underutilized sources.  As Jongsoo Lee wrote in The 
American Historical Review about Millett’s second volume on the Korean War, “Millett 
makes a significant contribution to this crowded field by providing what is both a 
comprehensive military history and a sophisticated treatment of the war’s diplomatic and 
political aspects.  Eschewing a particular characterization of the war, Millett emphasizes its 
complexity.”67   
        Several of Millett’s works focus on the Korean War: Their War for Korea: American, 
Asian, and European Combatants and Civilians, 1945-1953; The War for Korea, 1945-1950: 
A House Burning; and The War for Korea, 1950-1951: They Came from the North.
68
  He also 
assisted the Korean Institute of Military History in producing their three volume revised 
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official history of the Korean War.
69
  Millett argues that the Korean War was a complex and 
important event that most historians fail to understand.
70
  He takes in a variety of elements 
such as faith, political beliefs, culture, and balances them with various military factors from 
both sides to gain a more distilled understanding of an event. This approach provides depth 
and a different level of understanding to the Korean War which itself was a clash of a 
multitude of different cultures, ideas, and perspectives. 
       In contrast, there exists a small but active revisionist group of historians led by Bruce 
Cumings that focuses on Korea and the Korean War.  Cumings’ two scholarly works The 
Origins of the Korean War: Liberation and the Emergence of Separate Regimes, 1945-1947 
and The Origins of the Korean War, Volume II: The Roaring of the Cataract, 1947-1950 are 
the bases for much of his later popular works.
71
  Each book calls into question many parts of 
the traditional Korean War narrative, including the common understanding that the DPRK 
started the war on 25 June 1950.
72
  Cumings argues, “The beginning of the Korean War was 
in 1931-32, after Japanese forces invaded the northeast provinces of China and established 
the puppet state of Manchukuo.”73  While most of his earlier critiques focused on the causes 
of the war and reason for the conflict, in later works he began to question the legitimacy of 
the regime created by the U.S. in South Korea.   
        In The Korean War: A History a popular history of the Korean War, Cumings 
summarizes the arguments put forth in his two scholarly writings.  He identifies linkages 
between the early leadership of the ROK government, Army (ROKA) and the former 
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Imperial Japanese colonial administration that ruled Korea until August 1945.
74
  In 
articulating the North Korean view, Cumings notes: “To the North Koreans it is less the 
Japanese than the Korean quislings that matter: blood enemies. They essentially saw the war 
in 1950 as a way to settle the hash of the top command of the South Korean army, nearly all 
of whom had served the Japanese.”75 The other issue prominent in revisionist history is the 
accusation that the U.S. and ROKA forces committed more atrocities than the KPA before 
and during the war. Cumings draws attention to these arguments in The Korean War: A 
History and North Korea.
76
  In the words of Allan R. Millett, Cumings’ “eagerness to cast 
America’s officials and policy in the worst possible light, however, often leads him to 
confuse chronological cause and effect and to leap to judgments that cannot be supported by 
the documentation he cites or ignores.”77 
        Other revisionist historians stay closer to the traditional narrative.  William Stueck, Don 
Oberdorfer, and Charles K. Armstrong produced books focused on the Korean people, 
cultural, and politics behind the Korean War. Stueck’s two major works, The Korean War: 
An International History and Rethinking the Korean War: A New Diplomatic and Strategic 
History, bring out the complexity of the conflict.
78
  Stueck argues that the Korean War was “a 
substitute for World War III. What we mean is that in its timing, its course, and its outcome, 
it had a stabilizing effect on the Cold War.”79  He states that “As the crisis intensified, 
American leaders turned reflexively to multinational institutions. In December (1950) the 
United States took the lead in forming the NATO military command, appointing General 
Eisenhower as its first head.”80   
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        Don Oberdorfer and Charles Armstrong take a cultural and political approach towards 
understanding the Korean people, their aspirations, and the actions of different Korean 
leaders and groups involved in the creation of the two Korean states.
81
  Don Oberdorfer’s 
work, The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History explains the perspective of the two Korean 
states but focuses more on developments in South Korea due to the Korean War.  Oberdorfer 
argues that the memory of the horror of the Korean War and the threat of destruction from 
their northern cousins created a unified southern Korean culture that was stronger and more 
resilient than before the war.
82
   
        Charles Armstrong’s The Korean Revolution: 1945-1950, analyzes the creation of the 
DPRK.  Indicting his affiliations in the field of Korean history, Armstrong thanks Bruce 
Cumings in the first sentence of his acknowledgments.
83
  Armstrong views “North Korea [as] 
an ideal microcosm for understanding the phenomenon of Marxist-Leninist state socialism.”84 
He asserts that:  
“A major source of the DPRK’s strength and resiliency, as well as many of its 
serious flaws and shortcomings…lies in the poorly understood origins of the 
North Korean system.”85   
 
Armstrong argues that the DPRK’s ability to resist change emanated from the system created 
during the founding of the DPRK, a system that fused classic Korean narratives, Marxist-
Leninist certainty, and mass organization unparalleled in the communist world.  These 
revisionist works enhanced the field of Korean history by adding a different understanding of 
the “Hermit Kingdom.”86  
        Other authors grappled with the tactical and operational issues of the war and where it 
fits in the history of the U.S. Army.  Two of David Rees’ works on the Korean War, Korea: 
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The Limited War and The Korean War: History and Tactics deal with Korea as a new type of 
war and some of the changes that resulted.
87
  Paddy Griffith’s Forward into Battle: Fighting 
Tactics from Waterloo to the Near Future does not focus on Korean War tactics but deal with 
the result of changes in the Army after Korea and influenced the U.S. Army that fought in 
Viet Nam.
88
 In contrast Stephen E. Pease’s Psywar: Psychological Warfare in Korea: 1950-
1953 deals specifically with psychological warfare and how it was employed in Korea against 
a communist force that was heavily indoctrinated and used similar psychological warfare 
tactics.
89
  D. Clayton James and Anne Sharp Wells Refighting the Last War: Command and 
Crisis in Korea 1950-1953 take on the issues of command and the challenges that U.S. 
commanders faced adapting to limited war with limited means.
90
  Each of these authors 
contribute to understanding the changes that occurred during and after the Korean War and 
place this war as different from the previous world wars and sets the stage for conflicts 
throughout the Cold War.  
        William T. Bowers’ three volume The Line: Combat in Korea, January-February 1951, 
Striking Back: Combat in Korea, March-April 1951 and with John T. Greenwood Passing the 
Test: Combat in Korea, April-June 1951 offer an in depth look and analysis of the Eighth 
Army and how it grappled with the CPVF.
91
  These three works offer a unique analysis of the 
Eighth Army adaptation to the CPVF “man over machine” concepts and includes intense 
firsthand accounts of those who fought. Bowers and Greenwood link the actions of squads 
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and platoons to the greater struggle and emphasis the importance of the individual soldier and 
small unit to the greater success of the Eighth Army. 
        When reviewing Korean War literature, one type is hard to ignore:  the official histories 
written for various nations’ militaries.  In the field of official Korean War histories, the U.S. 
Navy and Air Force each commissioned a single volume on the war that detailed their 
contributions to the conflict. The U.S. Air Force official history claims that airpower 
achieved the U.N. military objectives.
92
  This assertion was harshly disputed by Ridgway in 
his own work The Korean War.
93
  The U.S. Marine Corps commissioned a five volume set on 
the conflict that focused on the crucial role of the Marine Corps.  Three of the five volumes 
examined the maneuver period. The fourth volume, The East-Central Front, focused on the 
period from the summer of 1951 through February 1952.  The fifth volume, Operations in 
West Korea, covers March 1952 through July 1953.  Each of these official histories provides 
great detail on U.S. armed forces contributions during the Korean War. 
        The U.S. Army has produced more works on the Korean War than any other service and 
continues to support the writing of new monographs on different aspects of the conflict.  
These works provide a detailed accounting of the U.S. Army during the entire conflict in 
contrast to other works that tend to focus on just the first third.  The U.S. Army Center of 
Military History commissioned the writing of four chronological volumes that cover the 
period before 25 June 1950 until the end of hostilities.  Then it published three histories 
focused on the contributions and changes in medical services, logistical operations, and 
combat support.
94
  These official histories examine technical changes that transformed rear 
area operations during the war.  Due to the desegregation carried out during the Korean War, 
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the U.S. Army examined the segregated 24
th
 Infantry Regiment and its performance prior to 
the unit casing its colors (ceasing to exist) after desegregation in 1951.
95
  Most recently, in 
2009, the Center for Military History published a history of the 65
th
 Infantry Regiment, a 
Puerto Rican regiment similar to the 24
th
 Infantry Regiment. In Honor and Fidelity: The 65
th
 
Infantry in Korea, 1950-1953, Gilberto N. Villahermosa explores the challenges faced by the 
65
th
 due to language and cultural barriers that resulted in tactical failures and relief of its 
commander and senior officers.
96




 Infantry Regiments is an 
important part of the desegregation of the U.S. Army and the challenges faced implementing 
that policy in combat.  The theme that runs throughout all these works is that the Korean War 
was different and each books grapples with the differences. 
        Despite these numerous works on the Korean War, relatively little was written about the 
doctrinal changes the U.S. Army went through as it fought a static war in Korea from 1951-
1953, resulting in a drastic revision of FM 100-5 Operations (1954) and almost all the 
supporting manuals.
97
  The U.S. Army did produce a book for soldiers that analyzed nineteen 
small unit actions that occurred throughout the war. This book was disseminated to soldiers, 
and the case studies were designed to serve as examples of soldiers in modern combat.  
Combat Actions in Korea served as a soldiers’ primer on how to fight outnumbered and at 
night against Communist forces.   
        To ensure the Korean Military Assistance Command (KMAG) was not forgotten, the 
U.S. Army commissioned, Korean Military Assistance Command: KMAG, In Peace and 
War, to record its efforts.  The U.S. Army also created two lengthy pictorial histories of the 
conflict that showed the war in all its different forms.  These official histories provided an 
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intuitional answer to the questions of what happened and why.  As a whole, these books 
provide context, but do not discuss what affect the war in Korea had on the organization, 
training, and doctrine of the U.S. Army.  
        This thesis contributes to the existing literature concerning the U.S. Army in the Korean 
War by examining the development of operational concepts it used during the conflict.  The 
U.S. Army was forced to adapt to its new role as the shield of the free world, as outlined in 
NSC 68.   This made the Korean War the first test of the validity of the Containment strategy, 
focused on using the military as a defensive tool to protect the nation’s offensive economic 
and political capabilities.  These adaptations, the operational concepts that the U.S. Army 
developed, provide an insight into how the U.S. Army adapts to change.  The study of the 
operational and doctrinal changes that occurred during the trench warfare period enhances the 
understanding of the Korean War’s place in U.S. Army development. 
28 
 
Chapter 2: New Global Situation 
The new global situation that developed in the late 1940’s included a dramatic shift in 
global conditions.  This shift produced dramatic changes in U.S. strategy, and eventually, 
how the U.S. Army fights.  This change crystallized with the outbreak of hostilities on the 
Korean Peninsula in late June 1950.  To understand the development of operational concepts 
during the Korean War, it is necessary to understand the disconnect that developed between 
U.S. national strategy and U.S. Army operational concepts prior to the start of the war.  It is 
then possible to analyze the development of U.S. Army operational concepts during the 
Korean War.  This change in concepts would remedy the gap between U.S. strategy, 
Containment, and prewar U.S. Army operational concepts. 
        The U.S., in coordination with the Soviet Union, U.K., and the Republic of China 
(ROC) created the U.N. with the signing of its Charter on 26 June 1945.
1
  From the summer 
of 1945 to the outbreak of the Korean War in the summer of 1950, a world where the Big 
Three, the United States, the United Kingdom and Soviet Union, would solve the world’s 
problems through negotiations disintegrated.  Instead, the U.S. and its allies found themselves 
in a bi-polar world fighting a constant political, economic and at times military conflict with 
the communist bloc, led by the Soviet Union.  This was different from the world U.S. leaders 
imagined and tried to build through the U.N. Charter.
2
   
        The rapid development of a Soviet atomic capability, the need for a unanimous vote by 
the Security Council to employ the legitimacy of the U.N., and the spread of militant 
communism changed the perspective of U.S. leaders.  Internal U.S. government changes 
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created new tools for the U.S. government to use to achieve its strategic goals.  The passage 
of the National Security Act of 1947, enhanced in 1949, created the Central Intelligence 
Agency (CIA), U.S. Air Force (USAF), Department of Defense (DoD), the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff (JCS), the Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, National Security Resource Boards 
(NSRB), and National Security Council (NSC) changed the U.S. security structure.
3
                   
        Winston Churchill raised the collective call to arms in his “Sinews of Peace” speech 
describing an “Iron Curtain” that had fallen across Eastern Europe in 1946.4  Churchill was 
the first major figure to label the Soviet Union as no longer a partner in preserving the global 
peace.
5
  Eleven days earlier, on 22 February 1946, George F. Kennan, in the “Long 
Telegram” articulated many of Churchill’s concerns.6  It was not until the article, “The 
Sources of Soviet Conduct,” by George F. Kennan as Mr. “X,” and the buildup of 
demonstrated Soviet intransigence that U.S. leaders began to take the problem seriously.
7
  
Both Kennan and Churchill argued that the U.S. and its allies needed to adjust to the changed 
world.  Their central argument was that the U.S. and Soviet Union were now in competition 
to shape different global systems. 
        The Korean War was the first war fought when both sides possessed atomic capabilities.  
With the advent of atomic weapons, U.S. and Western European leaders feared that another 
total war would destroy the planet in an atomic holocaust.
8
  Military leaders viewed a war 
with atomic weapons as militarily possible. Political leaders did not view it as politically or 
morally feasible.
9
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                NSC 68 codified the shift in the “Truman Doctrine” from limited engagement to 
containment of the Soviet Union, designed to stop communist expansion through intensive 
U.S. engagement and support of the free world.
10
  At present we do not have a similar 
document that enumerates Stalin’s strategy for the Soviet Union in the post-WWII period.  
Despite the lack of documented strategy, the actions of Stalin from August 1945 until his 
death in 1953 demonstrate a desire to expand the reach of the Soviet Union through the 
creation of dependent communist states.
11
   
        The Soviet Union’s actions in Korea exemplified Soviet strategy in regions “liberated” 
by the Red Army.  Strategically Stalin wanted to buy time through various maneuvers short 
of war while the occupied satellite states were integrated into the Soviet system.
12
  In 
contrast, Truman’s America rested on three pillars: economic superiority, political legitimacy 
based on over 150 years of democratic rule, and military dominance through the control of 
atomic weapons.  The corner stone of America’s deterrent power was its unmatched military 
reach, and the ability to employ its atomic arsenal against any nation.  This situation changed 
in August 1949 when the Soviets detonated their own atomic device.
13
  This technological 
achievement was enhanced by the military and political victory of Mao Zedong and his 
Chinese communists when they defeated U.S. client Chiang Kai-shek and establishing the 
People’s Republic of China (PRC) on 1 October 1949.14   
        Before WWII ended, various Korean factions began to fight over what their nation 
should become.  The politics on the Korean Peninsula immediately fused with the developing 
superpower conflict between the U.S. and Soviet Union.  The temporary arrangements 
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designed at the end of the war with Japan brought the forces of both powers onto the Korean 
Peninsula.
15
  Each of their political agendas accompanied their military forces to Korea. 
        The division and occupation of Korea provides an example of each superpowers plan for 
the post-WWII world.  After the dropping of atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, in 
August 1945, Brigadier General George Lincoln, Colonel Charles Bonesteel and Colonel 
Dean Rusk, were tasked to create a plan on how to divide Allied occupational duties in 
Korea.  The atomic bomb, coupled with the swift invasion of Manchuria by the Soviet Red 
Army, forced a snap decision with respect to the division of the Korean Peninsula.  The task 
of disarming and repatriating Japanese civilians and military forces was the primary military 
task envisioned by these planners.  In due course, a Joint Commission would determine the 
political future of Korea.  Huddled over a National Geographic map of Korea, on the night of 
10-11 August 1945 at the U.S. Army Operations Division office, they decided to divide the 
Korean Peninsula at the 38
th
 Parallel between the U.S. and the Soviet Union.
16
                   
        The first twelve months of occupation saw two visions of Korea coalesce under the two 
powers responsible for the de-colonization and creation of a Korean state.  The Soviets 
created a communist Korean state, controlled by Korean guerrillas who fought the Japanese 
in the 1920s and 1930s in Manchuria.  These guerrillas found refuge in the Soviet Union. 
From 1941-1945 they planned and trained to take over Korea after the expulsion of the 
Japanese.
17
  These were the iron disciplined and Soviet supported Korean Communists led by 
Kim Il Sung. They were assisted by the Soviet Union and later the PRC.
18
  In contrast, the 
U.S. occupation in South Korea set off a bloody and fractious period where numerous 
political parties fought for control, legitimacy, and support from the United States Army 
Military Government in Korea (USAMGIK) and the Korean people in the south.  Unlike the 
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guidance from Stalin, the guidance to Lieutenant General John R. Hodge, USAMGIK 
commander, from Washington D.C. was vague and unhelpful. 
        Under Soviet occupation, Kim Il Sung became the leader of the North Korean Workers 
Party in December of 1945, followed by his appointment as Chairman of the North Korean 
Provisional People’s Committee (NKPPC) on 8 February 1946.19  Kim was supported by 
Korean guerrillas trained and based in Siberia.  To accomplish the creation of a Korean 
communist state, it was essential that Kim create a “United Front” that mimicked Soviet 
policy in Manchuria and Eastern Europe.  Chinese influenced Korean Communists from 
Yen’an were trained and supported by Mao.  Soviet influenced and trained Korean 
Communists from Manchuria were led by Kim.  Last there were local Korean Communists, 
who operated underground during the Japanese occupation.  The “United Front” also 
included the leftist faction of Korean Democratic Party in the north and the Young Friends 
Party.  Each represented different parts of Korean society but were later infiltrated by Kim’s 
communists and purged once he had enough leverage to squeeze out the original leaders of 
these “friendly parties”.20          
        South of the 38
th
 Parallel, the Imperial Japanese Government initiated a ceasefire on 15 
August 1945 and formally surrendered on 2 September.  But it was not until 8 September that 
XXIV Corps of the U.S. Tenth Army under command of General Hodge arrived at Inchon, 
Korea.  Hodge received the formal surrender of Governor-General Abe Nobuyuki the 
following day, 9 September 1945.
21
  XXIV Corps and its divisions came from fighting in 
Okinawa and the Philippines and were preparing to invade Japan.
22
  From 15 August, until 
the arrival 7
th
 Infantry Division and the XXIV Corps headquarters on 8 September, the 
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Japanese allowed Yo Un-hyong to establish the Committee for the Preparation of Korean 
Independence, which included local Communists under Pak Hon-Yong.  On 6 September, 
they established a People’s Republic of Korea.23  On 9 September businessmen and 
conservatives formed the Korean Democratic Party.
24
  The divide between left and right was 
thus established in Seoul as the Americans arrived.           
        Throughout Hodge’s occupation (9 September 1945 – 15 August 1948), various Korean 
factions fought for legitimacy, authority, and control.  Former nobles, land lords, former 
Japanese régime government workers, capitalist, rightist democrats, and intellectuals 
coalesced around Syngman Rhee.  Right wing groups gained indirect control of the Korean 
National Police (KNP) and nascent ROKA through the control of volunteers for both forces.
25
  
The right wing political leaders began to suppress the socialists, communists, and other leftist 
groups using the KNP and purges of the ROKA.
26
                   
        The U.N. Interim Assembly approved an American resolution to hold Korean elections 
in May 1948 with or without the participation of Kim and his government north of the 38
th
 
parallel.  Leaders in Pyongyang knew that an election supervised by the U.N. and USAMGIK 
would lead to their defeat and a loss of legitimacy for their fledgling communist state.  
Instead, Kim offered a new Soviet style unification constitution, at a protest conference, in 
Pyongyang from 19-29 April 1948.
27
  Kim supported civil unrest through the Kangdong 
Institute in the form of communist attacks on the KNP, government officials, and rightists on 
Cheju-do Island in April 1948.
28
  The 10 May election boycotted by Kim and condemned by 
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the Soviet Union brought about the creation of the ROK, on 15 August 1948) and the DPRK, 
on 9 September 1948.
29
  These two antagonistic states divided the Korean Peninsula. 
        Despite setbacks, the Truman administration supported the U.N.  In early 1950 the 
Soviets boycotted UNSC meetings because of the U.S. refusal to allow Mao’s PRC to assume 
the “China” Security Council seat from Chiang’s rump Republic of China.  With Stalin and 
Mao’s support, Kim gambled on an all-out military invasion designed to destroy the ROK 
government in one month.  The Soviets were absent when the issue of the 25 June 1950 
DPRK invasion of the ROK came before the UNSC.
30
  The U.S. seized this opportunity to 
reinforce a collective response with the legitimacy of a UNSC mandate; the U.S. and its allies 
condemned the aggression and struck a forceful diplomatic blow against Soviet policy.   
        Through UNSC Resolutions, the DPRK invasion was denounced as an act of aggression, 
member states were authorized and encouraged to send support, specifically military forces, 
to defend the ROK.  U.S. leadership, supported by its allies, ensured the swift passage of the 
resolutions. These resolutions pitted the legitimacy of U.N., led by the U.S., against the 
communist powers on the Korean peninsula.
31
  This was a colossal diplomatic blunder by the 
Soviet Union, which they would never repeat during the remainder of the Cold War.          
        The challenge of aggression in Korea was met by the rapidly evolving American 
security policy making machinery.  Changes within the U.S. government revamped the policy 
making and implementing branches of the U.S. government.
32
  Previously, U.S. foreign 
policy depended on the personality of the President, with priority given to the State 
Department to help him define U.S. foreign relations and policy priorities.  Dr. Charles A. 
Stevenson articulated the gravity of the change by quoting then Senator John Chandler 
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Gurney (R-SD), “It is now within our power to give the President the help he so urgently 
needs, and replace the security organization of 1798 with the organization of 1947.”33   
        In NSA 1947, the U.S. Army was downgraded in status with respect to strategic planning 
within the U.S. government.  Now the Department of the Army, no longer the senior 
Department of War, was only one part of a coordinated defense team.  The Army and Navy 
were no longer autonomous departments of the U.S. government.  But this change in 
governmental structure did not immediately alter the way the Army thought about warfare.  
Nor did it influence the Army’s vision of its substantive role in national defense, or the way 
the Army thought the nation should fight future wars.  The Army remained convinced that 
only U.S. ground forces could ensure victory over any future opponent.  Despite the passage 
of the National Security Act of 1947, its effect on how the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) would 
fight future wars remained unclear.
 34
     
         NSC 68 provided an answer: the free world would use its political, economic and 
psychological capabilities as offensive weapons to defeat similar Soviets capabilities.  In 
contrast, the military power of the free world would serve as a “force in being,” that would 
provide a shield of deterrence against overt Soviet aggression.
35
  This was a novel, untried 
strategic concept, based on collective security in times of peace.  It required the nations of the 
free world to create a standing global military defense system.   
        This Cold War strategy of protracted employment of political, economic, and 
psychological weapons to achieve national objectives was a decisive break with past 
American strategies.  Previous American strategies focused on the use of overwhelming 
military power to annihilate enemies.  President Roosevelt’s “unconditional surrender” was 
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the apogee of this American strategy.  To successfully implement the Containment strategy of 
Cold War, the U.S. and free world powers would need a credible military capability in being. 
But there was a fundamental problem: an adequate free world military shield did not exist in 
the summer of 1950.  
The strategy of Containment articulated a need for defensive attritional warfare on 
any future battlefield to check communist aggression.  NSC 68 required the U.S. military to 
fight defensively to protect the free world economic and political order, if the forces in did 
not deter Soviet aggression.  Defensive attritional tactics represented the antithesis of the 
Army operational concepts in 1950.  The prevailing Strategic-Operational-Tactical Crosswalk 
prior to NSC 68 connected national strategy to a military strategy in a specific theater of war.  
It then connected that strategy to the operational concepts used by units that would swiftly 
defeat an enemy – and this was both simple and long standing.  The U.S. military followed 
pre-established concepts articulated in OPLAN Offtackle, which was designed to fight a war 
as quickly and decisively as possible.
36
   
        The U.S. Army assimilated atomic weapons into their panoply of weapons in the same 
fashion that they integrated radar, the combustion engine in the form of tanks and trucks, 
radios, machine guns, and aircraft.  All these weapons would, in the view of Army leaders, 
support the infantry, the core of the Army.   
        On 4 February 1949, Bradley, soon to become the first Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff in August of 1949, gave a speech on “Creating a Sound Military Force”.   The speech 
was published as the lead article in the premier Army journal, Military Review, in May 1949.  
Bradley outlined his vision of how the Army would fight a future war within the design of the 
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National Security Act of 1947.
37




        Bradley made it clear the armed forces would fight in a way similar to WWII, with more 
atomic bombs.  In the summer of 1950 the new bureaucratic machine, DoD, and its older core 
component, the U.S. Army, were not focused on fashioning a defensive shield to protect the 
free world.  Instead, the DoD was focused and designed to annihilate the perceived enemy, 
the Soviet Union, in a swift and offensive war of annihilation.
39
   
         In support of this decisive offensive paradigm, the Army, in August 1949, published its 
updated doctrine, FM 100-5 Operations (1949).  It standardized how the Army would 
conduct operations in the next war.  The idea of defensive attritional warfare was not 
included.  Neither were ideas of limited war, coalition war, or the importance of building 
local armies.
40
  Some change occurred when the U.S. Army worked to codify lessons from 
WWII.  As Doughty noted in his study of U.S. Army doctrine from 1946-1976, “The 
requirement for closely coordinated and effective firepower emerged as one of the primary 
lessons of World War II.”41  The Army also recognized the need to provide its forces with a 
doctrine for “Special Operations,” in the form of two new manual FM 31-20 Operations 
Against Guerrilla Forces and FM 31-21 Organization and Conduct of Guerrilla Warfare, 
both written before the war but not published until after it started.  This was a continuation of 
pervious doctrinal developments.  When FM 100-5 Operations (1949) defined “Special 
Operations” it focused on unique terrain, not unique missions, except Partisan Operations, 
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which received eight paragraphs of explanation.  These technical, tactical, and doctrinal 
changes were just starting as the Korean War began. 
                The operational concepts taught at the Command and General Staff College in 
1949-1950 did not focus on implementing the strategic ideas envisioned in NSC 68.  Rather, 
the U.S. Army system was designed to repeat the success of WWII through the employment 
of amphibious, airborne and armor concepts directed at an aggressor state, supported by 
conventional and atomic bombs.  These operational concepts were designed around an 
offensive maneuver war that would include a series of battles designed to annihilate the 
enemy on his territory, to destroy his war making capability, capture key terrain and destroy 
the enemies will to resist.  When the Korean War began, these were operational concepts the 
U.S. Army executed until they were ordered to stop.  This intra-governmental disconnect 
between the proposed national strategy, Containment, and U.S. Army operational concepts 
was revealed as the Korean War developed.   
        In contrast, the DPRK used a Soviet designed plan, led by Soviet T-34 tanks, and 
supported by Soviet 122mm artillery pieces, to cross the 38
th
 parallel into the ROK.
42
  The 
KPA did not drive south of the 38
th
 Parallel to wage limited warfare.  They aimed to unify the 
Korean Peninsula under Kim’s communist government in a month.  Their battle plan was 
created by Soviet advisors and advised down to the division level, by Soviet officers, during 
the initial assault.  Based on their uniforms, equipment, and tactics the KPA was a Korean 
clone of the Red Army.
43
   
        The invasion of the ROK by the DPRK forced Truman to commit American forces in 
defense of the ROK.  Ridgway described the ROKA defense against the KPA, “It was as if a 
few troops of Boy Scouts with hand weapons had undertaken to stop a Panzer Unit.”44  In 
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September 1950 the Inchon landing was about to execute and General Walton H. Walker’s 
mixed U.S./Korean/Commonwealth Eighth Army was holding the Pusan perimeter and 
preparing to breakout.  After four years of bureaucratic wrangling, this dire military situation 
forced the long debate over national strategy to a conclusion.  On 30 September 1950, NSC 
68 was approved and became national strategy.
45
  But what the strategy of Containment 
meant in practice still remained unclear.   
        NSC 68 focused on a defensive and attritional strategy centered on Europe, not Asia.  It 
also planned to attain U.S. aims in a generally peaceful environment that would avoid armed 
conflict.  The Strategic-Operational-Tactical cross walk for the Containment strategy was 
more complex than the previous strategy derived from NSC 20/4 and conceptualized in 
OPLAN Offtackle, which focused on a campaign against the Soviet Union.
46
  NSC 68 stated 
the operational areas that it expected the military shield to defend: everywhere not under the 
control of the Soviet Union or its satellites.
47
  NSC 68 tasked the DoD “to provide an 
adequate defense against air attack on the United States and Canada and an adequate defense 
against air and surface attack on the United Kingdom and Western Europe, Alaska, the 
Western Pacific, Africa, and the Near and Middle East, and on the long lines of 
communication to these areas.”48 This identified a problem: instead of focusing on attacking 
the enemy controlled area, the DoD had to plan to conduct defensive military operations 
across the globe. 
        From September 1950 until June 1951, the Army continued to operate under the logic of 
previous strategic concepts: when the U.S. Army fought, it would annihilate its enemy.  To 
adjust to the nation’s new strategy, the U.S. Army wrote a new cornerstone doctrinal manual 
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and supporting manuals, while fighting the Korean War and soon after the signing of the 
armistice.
49
  The Army also adjusted programs of instruction for its school system.
50
   
        In the first year of the Korean War, the U.S. Army executed offensive and defensive 
maneuver based operational concepts as prescribed in FM 100-5 (1949).  One of the reasons 
the U.S. Army was able to come to terms with the KPA and later the CPVF concerned the 
strategy and operational concepts they both employed.  From June 1950 through June 1951, 
both Communist forces planned to win the war through swift battles of annihilation, albeit 
through the application of different offensive operational concepts and nested tactics. Both 
CPVF and Eight Army operational concepts and objectives changed after June 1951.  
         The defense of the Pusan perimeter followed U.S. Army defensive doctrine; it was 
focused on building up combat power while reducing the enemy’s combat power followed by 
a breakout.  The combined Inchon amphibious turning movement and breakout from the 
Pusan perimeter were clear examples of prevailing U.S. Army defensive and offensive 
operational doctrine.  The concept of an amphibious flanking movement that sever enemy 
lines of communication came directly from FM 100-5 Operations (1949), Chapter Eleven, 
Section Twelve: Joint Amphibious Operations.
51
   
        When the Eighth Army retreated during the Chinese Second Phase Offensive, it was not 
pretty but the reasons for this retreat were sound and complied with FM 100-5 Operations.
52
  
Leadership characteristics, personal and forceful, exhibited by Walker in the Pusan perimeter 
and Ridgway in command of the Eighth Army followed leadership guidance put forth in FM 
100-5 Operations.
53
  Coordinated firepower, combined arms maneuver, limited retrograde 
movements designed to degrade the enemy, technical superiority, and a focus on the 
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offensive summarized the operational concepts employed by the Eighth Army during the first 
year of combat operations in Korea.
54
 
        These offensive operational concepts largely disappeared from the battlefield during the 
last two years of combat.  This second phase, marked by protracted trench warfare along the 
Main Line of Resistance (MLR), required a different set of operational concepts.  These 
operational concepts were developed by the U.S. Army to fight the limited and defensive 
attritional war prescribed by national security policy.  This required the U.S. Army to rewrite 
its entire doctrine, while it tripled in size.  To execute the strategy of Containment, after the 
Korean armistice, required operational concepts similar to those the Army developed to 
defend the ROK from 1951-1953. 
        The operational concepts developed after 1951included a focus on small unit tactical 
operations, refinement of fire support into a tool of the small unit leader, the standardization 
of special operations in direct support of the tactical commander, employment and support of 
coalition forces, and the use of advisors to train, advise, and assist local forces.  These 
innovations became the operational concepts of the second two years of the Korean War.   
        The U.S. Army adjusted its operational concepts the hard way, through combat.  It 
experimented and tested new equipment and tactics in an attempt to restore the status quo 
ante.  U.S. soldiers and Marines fought side-by-side with their Korean and U.N. allies to 
force the communist powers to accept the status quo ante, and then shouldered the military 
shield and defended the Korean De-Militarized Zone (DMZ).  This experience reshaped the 
U.S. Army’s approach to battle and created a different operational approach, tailored to wage 
the Cold War.  
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Chapter 3: Blood and Sprockets  
[The U.S. Army] could not fight its way out of a paper bag. 





        The primary concern of any tactical commander is the enemy; he designs his plans to 
counter his enemy’s tactics, in this way the enemy always gets a vote.  Throughout the 
Korean War, U.S. Army commanders adjusted to the tactics of their enemy, and restraints 
imposed by higher direction.  To develop the best tactics, there are several other 
considerations.  These considerations include the doctrine of the force, training of the 
soldiers, and equipment available.  The two greatest constraints placed on a commander are 
usually the quantity/quality of his men and the equipment/material resources available.  The 
“blood and sprockets” or “men and machines” provide the raw materials available to a 
commander.  Men and machines often affect the design of operational concepts as much or 
more than the strategy imposed by political superiors.  To grasp the operational concepts 
employed during the static period of the Korean War, it is important to understand the enemy 
and his operational concepts along with the U.N. forces and tools available (men and 
machines) to the Eighth Army commander. 
 
Eighth Army and the CPVF/KPA 
        When the Korean War started, the U.S. armed forces, either in Japan or the U.S., were 
not prepared to fight the mechanized KPA.
2
  The U.S. Army and Marine Corps’ were both 
undermanned and ill equipped.  Many of the U.S Army’s best weapon systems, developed at 
the end of WWII, were not supplied to U.S. soldiers stationed in Japan.  Soldiers in Japan had 
started to transition from occupation duty to combat training in the summer of 1949.  They 
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were not equipped with the newest tanks and anti-tank weapons, weapons viewed as 
unnecessary for the mission in Japan.
3
  These units were also not trained to the standards 
necessary to fight a combined arms enemy.
4
  Budget cuts, personnel shortages, directed social 
changes (the Doolittle Board and forced integration) uncertainty within the ranks, and the 
lack of a clearly defined mission all hindered the U.S. Army between the end of WWII and 
the beginning of the Korean War.
5
   
        In spite of these conditions, the U.S. Army and Marine Corps quickly deployed major 
elements of six divisions, the 24
th
 Infantry Division (ID), 1
st







 ID, and the 1
st
 Marine Division, to the Korean Peninsula.
6
  The first, the 24
th
 ID, landed 
units within ten days, and the other five arrived and, with their ROKA counterparts, regained 
the 38
th
 parallel in about 90 days.
7
  Both the U.S. Army and KPA operational concepts were 
based on maneuver and decisive battle.  Through innovative leadership and superior material, 
the Eighth Army defeated the KPA with offensive maneuver operational concepts it 
developed during WWII. 
        The Pusan Perimeter defined this type of maneuver warfare in the defense. In describing 
the defense, Lieutenant General Walton Walker, commander of the Eighth U.S. Army, stated:      
There will be no more retreating, withdrawal, or readjustment of the lines, or 
anything else you want to call it… If the enemy gets into Taegu you will find 
me resisting him in the streets and I’ll have some of my trusted people with 
me and you had better be prepared to do likewise. Now get back to your 
division and fight it! I don’t want to see you back from the front again unless 
it’s in your coffin.8 
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Once the KPA advance was stopped and the Eighth Army adequately supplied, they pushed 
the KPA back beyond the 38
th
 Parallel in concert with the Inchon landing by X Corps.   
        The Korean battles fought from the arrival of Task Force Smith on 1 July 1950, through 
to the U.N. advance to the Yalu River, the subsequent retreat back to the 37
th
 Parallel, and the 
establishment of the MLR mostly north of the 38
th
 Parallel, were fought and won with the 
tactics prescribed in FM 100-5 Operations.
9
  As Roy K. Flint states in America’s First 
Battles, 1776-1965, “The tactical defeats endured by the officers and men of the 24th Division 
were rooted in the failure of the Army… to prepare itself during peacetime for battle.”10 A 
lack of training, not doctrine or operational concepts, failed the U.S. Army in the first few 
weeks of the Korean War. After receiving a few more weeks of training at the hands of the 
KPA, the Eighth Army struck back. The first year of the Korean War was warfare as taught at 
Ft. Benning or Ft. Leavenworth.
11
     
        The U.S. soldiers who fought these battles were not tutored in the ideas of containment 
and limited war.  Ridgway wrote, “You must understand that I was thinking as I had right 
from the start, in terms of attack.”12  Many soldiers who remained in the U.S. Army or were 
called back into service were veterans of WWII.  The young officers that commanded 
platoons and companies were trained in the tactics of the offensive, based on the 1944 or 
1949 Field Manuals.  These veterans seasoned the under strength divisions of the Eighth 
Army.
13
  Men like Corporal Leo M. Brennen joined 2
nd
 Platoon, Able Company, 34
th
 Infantry 
Regiment, on 12 August 1950 as a squad leader during the defense of the Pusan Perimeter.  
Brennen was a typical veteran of WWII in the Pacific.  He immediately took point for the 
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company assault that took place on the same day he arrived in the unit.  His task was to lead 
the company’s lead squad, soldiers he did not know, to retake a hill top along the Naktong 
line that a previous KPA assault took on 6 August.  For a veteran of WWII called back to 
service, this was another day fighting for another hill.
14
   
        To such men, from the rank of Corporal through General, the U.S. Army and Marine 
Corps were focused on offensive operations.  Find the enemy.  Fix the enemy position with 
infantry, artillery and air attach.  Finish him with flanking armor, artillery barrage, infantry 
assaults and supporting attack aviation.  Speed, mobility, and shock effect were their tools.  
Every effort was focused to gain deep penetrations and encircle the enemy, cutting off his 
lines of supply.  This was the doctrine the U.S. Army used to fight and win battles.
15
  The 
breakouts from the Pusan Perimeter, coupled with the amphibious landing of Operation 
CHROMITE, were classic examples of applied U.S. Army doctrine.  As Roy Appleman 
wrote about the landing, “Control of the seas gives mobility to military power.  Mobility and 
war of maneuver have always brought the greatest prizes and the quickest decisions to their 
practitioners.”16  These operational concepts proved very useful during the first year of the 
war, the war of maneuver.   
        Communist tactics during the war varied, as the conditions in which they fought 
changed.  The first phase of the KPA offensive, from 22 June 1950 through 22 September 
1950, was dictated by Soviet advisors.
17
  It was characterized by a fusion of combined arms, 
Soviet maneuver tactics, and a popular uprising led by guerrilla cadres.  The combined arms 
mechanized assault incorporated armored spearheads, supported by mechanized field artillery 
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and close air support, with aggressive infantry assaults that employed encirclements, to 
outflank ROKA forces.
18
   
        The guerrilla cadres that attempted to start the “general uprising” operated in the ROK 
prior to the invasion.  These communist cadres combined cells associated with the outlawed 
South Korean Labor Party (SKLP) and communist cells in the ROKA.  The ROKA cells 
conducted a series of mutinies that began in 1947.  These mutineers led an insurgency from 
the mountainous regions of the ROK.  These mutineers were supported by graduates from the 
Kangdong Institute, located in the DPRK just north of the 38
th
 Parallel.  The Kangdong 
Institute cadre infiltrated ten groups into South Korea starting in 1949 and ending in March 
1950, to prepare the people for liberation.
19
  The “general uprising” that was supposed to 
occur after the June 1950 invasion was a failure, due to aggressive ROK counter-insurgency 
operations prior to the June 1950.  In contrast, the Soviet trained, equipped, and advised KPA 
was successful up to the Naktong River.  At the Naktong River, U.S. and ROKA forces 
countered the KPA and held the line that became the Pusan Perimeter.  
        For the first time, the Eighth Army faced T-34 tanks.  M-24 Chaffee light tanks based in 
Japan were initially employed against the KPA and were ineffective. The U.S. Army reacted 
and shipped M-26 Pershing tanks, along with upgraded M4A3E8 Sherman tanks equipped 
with 76mm high velocity main guns, to Korea.  The first M-26 tanks arrived at Pusan from 
Ft. Knox on 7 August 1950.  The M4A3E8 tanks were shipped directly from Japan and 
Okinawa and arrived in July and August 1950.  These tanks, supported by close air support 
(CAS), and massive artillery dominated the KPA armored units.
20
   
        The initial failure of U.S. Army anti-armor weapon systems extended down to the 
bazooka’s used by infantry heavy weapons companies.  Quickly after arriving in Korea, 
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Army leaders realized that the M9A1 2.36 in. rocket launcher (bazooka) was ineffective 
against T-34 tanks, so the Army replaced it with the M20 3.5 in. “Super Bazooka,” which 
arrived in Korea in July 1950.
21
  KPA 122mm and 76mm artillery pieces outranged and 
outshot the ROKA’s shorter M3 105mm howitzers.  To counter the skilled KPA gunners and 
their Soviet artillery systems, the Army deployed a wide array of towed and self-propelled 
artillery that ranged from light M2A1 105mm towed howitzers to the heavy M43 8in 
Howitzer Motor Carriage (HMC) self-propelled howitzer.
22
   
        Air power was an important part of the KPA plan but the swift introduction of USAF 
combat aircraft eliminated the KPA aviation advantage.  The KPA fielded approximately 180 
aircraft, which consisted of 60 YAK/PO2 trainers, 40 YAK-3/7B/9/11 fighters, 70 IL-10 
attack bombers and ten reconnaissance planes.  In contrast, the fledgling ROK Air Force 
(ROKAF) had twelve liaison-type aircraft and ten AT-6 advanced trainers.
23
  On 26 June 
1950, the day after the KPA invasion, KMAG released ten F-51 fighters to the ROKAF.  The 
ROKAF did not have any pilots trained on these aircraft but they pilots that had trained on 
Imperial Japanese Army aircraft that would provide the core of the future ROKAF.
24
 
        In contrast, the U.S. Far East Command’s (FEC) subordinate U.S. Air Force element, 
U.S. Far East Air Forces (FEAF) was a modern air force with a total of 1,172 aircraft of 
various types.  Only 553 of these aircraft were part of operational units, most were F-80C jet 
interceptor aircraft. The remainder consisted of various bombers, reconnaissance, and cargo 
support units.
25
  On 27 June FEAF simultaneously helped to evacuate U.S. and other foreign 
nationals from Seoul, destroyed elements of the KPA Air Force and providing limited CAS to 
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  As U.N. ground forces began to support the ROKA, FEAF took control of 
the air and never lost that advantage. Dominance of the air was critical in containing 
communist forces along the MLR during the last two years of the conflict.  Throughout the 
conflict, FEAF tested and employed its newest aircraft against its Soviet counterparts and 
developed many of the air to air combat, precision bombing and CAS concepts still in use 
today.  
        U.N. dominance of the air and sea facilitated the rapid build-up of U.N. combat power.  
U.N airpower also hindered the KPA’s ability to conduct logistical operations during day 
light.  CAS doctrine was an inter-war development, but was not an U.S. Air Force priority 
prior to the Korean War despite the desire of the U.S. Army.
27
  The Eighth Army combined 
arms team used FEC’s dominance of the air and sea to cover its flanks while it conducted 
deep penetrations into KPA lines.  Defeating the KPA was a matter of building up enough of 
the correct forces with the correct equipment.  By the end of August 1950, the Eighth Army 
had enough equipment and was building up the man power necessary to go on the offensive.  
The breakout on 22 September 1950 completed the Eighth Army’s transition from the 
defense to the offense.
28
   
        The KPA was forced to abandon their maneuver combined arms doctrine after 
September 1950.  In the battles along the Naktong River, the majority of KPA tanks, planes 
and artillery were destroyed by U.N. aircraft, tank and anti-tank capabilities.
29
  The Inchon 
landing cut the KPA supply lines and forced them to retreat along mountain trails, under 
pressure from the Eighth Army and FEAF.  
        Without the proper tools, the KPA was forced to return to guerrilla tactics and await 
Soviet or Chinese intervention.  Coupled with the loss of equipment, the KPA’s loss of 
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skilled military technicians hindered its rebuilding and forced a change in KPA operational 
concepts.  Not every KPA soldier killed or captured during the retreat north was a technical 
expert, but the loss of 100,000 of the 135,000 man invasion force and most of its equipment 
severely hampered its rebuilding.  Appleman in, South to the Naktong North the Yalu, 
estimated that approximately 30,000 KPA officers and soldiers eventually made it back to 
North Korea in October and November 1950, based on U.S. and KPA sources.
30
  Mahoney, 
in his detailed study of the KPA and CPVF, Formidable Enemies, states that the 1
st
 Guerrilla 












 Divisions composed of ten 
thousand plus soldiers.
31
  It was assessed that only three-quarters of these soldiers were 
armed, but only with small arms.  The KPA tanks, trucks, and artillery that made them a 
combined arms force were either destroyed or left behind during their long retreat to the 
mountains north and east of Pyongyang.
32
   
      The KPA retreat lasted until the beginning of the Chinese Second Phase Offensive on 25 
November 1950.  The retreat focused on a KPA retrograde movement of soldiers to secure 
areas in the North Korean mountains, along the Chinese and Russian border.  There the KPA 
would regroup, rearm, and prepare to counterattack as part of the KPA 1
st
 Guerrilla Corps 
formed in October 1950.
33
  As directed by the PRC and DPRK leadership, many KPA 
officers and soldiers turned guerrilla and linked up with partisan groups already in South 
Korea.  Communist tactics changed when the Chinese People’s Volunteer Force (CPVF) 
entered the Korean conflict.  When the CPVF crossed the Yalu River in mass on 19 October 
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1950 it brought different offensive operational concepts designed to defeat a road bound 
army.
34
   
        Despite the destruction of the Soviet supported KPA by the Eighth Army and FEAF, the 
People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) armed forces, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), 
believed they possessed superior operational concepts that could defeat the Eighth Army.
35
  
Their operational construct was called “man over weapons”.  It was based on their experience 
against the U.S. trained and equipped Republic of China (ROC) Guomindang (GMD) army.
36
  
The Chinese communist forces were regular PLA units using the cover name, Chinese 
People’s Volunteer Force (CPVF), so officially the PRC was not involved in the war.  
Chairman Mao Zedong and Marshal Peng Dehuai assessed that they could destroy the Eighth 
Army faster than they destroyed the GMD in 1948 and 1949.  With a strong base in 
Manchuria and a better trained and equipped force than they possessed during the Chinese 
Civil War (1946-1949), Mao was confident that the CPVF could destroy the Americans, who 
were viewed as over reliant on technology.
37
   
        Marshal Peng’s CPVF fought differently than its KPA counterparts.  The KPA had tried 
to conduct a combined arms lighting war, which planned to unify the Korean Peninsula in a 
month.  KPA operational concepts were based on Soviet operational concepts and assisted by 
Soviet advisors.  In contrast, the CPVF employed operational concepts based on 25 years of 
communist Chinese insurgent warfare within a Chinese context.   
        From the launch of the CPVF First Phase Offensive on 25 October, through the collapse 
of the Second Phase Fifth Offensive around 22 May 1951, the CPVF used the Chinese 
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operational concept “man over machine.”  This concept focused on deception, encirclement, 
infiltration, concentration of forces at a decisive point, and close quarters combat, conducted 
at night.
38
  This operational concept was based on PLA success against GMD troops during 
the last phase of the Chinese Civil War (1946-1949).
39
  These tactics worked well during the 
First and Second Phase Offensives.  During the Third Phase Offensive the CPVF gained 
ground but failed to destroy any large U.N. formations.  The Fourth and two Fifth Phase 




        The First Phase Offensive launched on 25 October 1950 against ROKA forces and parts 
of the 1
st
 Calvary Division achieved its objective; it crippled the ROK II Corps at the Battle 
of Onjong.
41





 Infantry Division, instead they were mauled badly.
42
  This forced the Eighth Army 
to retreat to the vicinity of the 38
th
 Parallel, trading land for time.
43
  As Peng recorded in his 
memoir, most likely the success on 1 November against the 8
th
 Calvary Regiment:  
Only once did our troops wipe out an entire U.S. regiment and none of its men 
was able to escape; this took place in the Second Campaign.  Otherwise our 
troops were able to wipe out only whole U.S. battalions.  If a U.S. battalion 
encircled in the night were not wiped out while it was still dark, the Americans 




        Chinese offensive battles required a great amount of manpower and maneuver area to 
conduct flanking, infiltration, penetration and encirclement operations supported by partisan 
forces, to defeat their enemy.  The biggest difference between the KPA/CPVF tactics and the 
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tactics the U.S. and its allies used in Europe was the Communists dependence on infiltration, 
partisan forces, and light infantry night attacks.
45
  During the trench warfare period of the 
Korean War, the combined CPVF/KPA employed night based reconnaissance, infiltration, 
focused artillery and skilled infantry assaults on Eighth Army positions as their main effort.
46
   
        The Eighth Army adjusted to “man over weapons” operational concepts.  It adopted 
defensive and offensive operational concepts by modifying its tactics.  The 2
nd
 Infantry 
Division monthly Command Reports specify command directed changes focused on 
improving platoon, company and battalion defensive positions and the integration of fire 
support, during the Fourth and Fifth Phase offensives.
47
  The Training Bulletins published in 
1951 disseminated information on how to improve the SUT skills of the U.S. Army to 
counter CPVF night infiltration and massed assaults.  The areas stressed were defense of a 
position from night attack, coordination of Infantry-Armor operations, convoy procedures, 
integration of Infantry-Artillery-Armor-Anti-Aircraft Artillery massed fire tactics, and Patrol 
Missions.
48
  Ridgway stated in The Korean War:  
The system of maintaining close contact with support units, of advancing on 
phase lines, and of buttoning up at night to prevent infiltration, kept us from 
falling into traps the enemy laid for us and enabled us to blunt the power of his 




        The Eighth Army also came up with a mobile defensive concept called “fight and roll.”  
I Corps is credited with first employing the “fight and roll” concept, where forces would 
occupy a series of heavly defended locations and force the CPVF to fight for each position.  
This tactic were implemented across the Eighth Army with great success during the CPVF 
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Fourth and Fifth Phase Offensives.  Doughty in The Evolution of US Army Tactical Doctrine, 
1946-76, describes this concept: 
Under the concept of “fight and roll,” the defender remains in their position as 
long as possible—until the enemy had paid the maximum price and before the 
defensive positions were engulfed by the attackers.  After the highest possible 
cost was levied against the enemy, a rapid and orderly preplanned withdrawal 
was conducted to a previously prepared defensive position.  Although the 
defender might be forced to occupy as many as five or six subsequent 
positions, it was “inevitable”… that the surging mass would eventually halt.  
The I Corps’ description of the “fight and roll” defense stated: “[Enemy] Units 
will be decimated, command and control channels lost and equipment gone.  
The mass becomes a struggling, chaotic mixture of the remnants of many 
broken units.”50 
 
        Fight and roll was effectively employed during the Fifth Offensives First and Second 
Phases, once the CPVF attack culminated, units of the Eighth Army used their superior 
mobility and shifted to the offensive.
51
  In about six months (November 1950 to May 1951) 
the U.N. forces adapted to CPVF operational concept of man over weapons.  The U.N. forces 
ability to shift from defensive to offensive operations during the Fifth Phase offensives, 
confounded CPVF soldiers and commanders.  Bin Yu writes in Mao’s Generals Remember 
Korea:  
Many CPVF units were completely surprised by the blitzkrieg-style U.S. 
counterattacks and encirclement operations, tactics that were very different 




        During the five offensives the CPVF conducted from October 1950 through June 1951, 
it faced continuous logistical problems.  During their previous wars, Chinese communist 
forces gained most of their supplies from their better equipped enemies.
53
  This was not the 
case when fighting the Eighth Army after the CPVF Third Phase Offensive.  Using 
conventional bombs and napalm, FEAF destroyed abandoned U.N. heavy equipment.  These 
swift interdictions by U.N. aircraft hindered CPVF logistics.  The CPVF logistical system 
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was continually harried by U.N. aircraft, naval gunfire and long range artillery.
54
  This 
pressure on CPVF logistics forced the Central Military Commission (CMC) to create a 
standardized logistical system.  To support the massive CPVF armies, the PLA deployed tens 
of thousands of support troops.
55
  The Korean War taught the PLA the importance of efficient 
logistics in fighting a conventional war, the PLA would relearn this lesson when they fought 
the PAVN in 1979. 
        After the end of the Fifth Offensive Second Phase in late May 1951, Mao authorized 
Peng to change the operational concepts of the CPVF.  In traditionally cryptic form, Mao 
called the new operational concept “eating sticky candy.”56  In June of 1951, the CPVF 
troops were in retreat and the operational concept of “man over weapons” was in tatters.  
Peng began to establish a defensive line and implemented Mao’s new operational construct of 
“chewing sticky candy.”57  The Eighth Army moved steadily forward across the 38th Parallel 
at the end of May 1951.  Then the war took a drastic change.  The JCS cabled Ridgway, now 
U.N./FEC Commander, with new instructions that placed clear boundaries on the Korean 
War and prepared the commander for a negotiated end to the conflict.
58
  This ended the 
pursuit phase for the Eighth Army.  The Eighth Army continued to apply military pressure 
though Operation PILE DRIVER, which advanced the U.N. lines slowly north until 
November 1951, trying to force the CPVF/KPA to stop the war.
59
   
        For the next two years the CPVF/KPA learned how to eat Eighth Army flavored sticky 
candy.  Mao’s operational concept of “eating sticky candy” involved a steady degradation of 
Eighth Army forces through the conduct of limited night attacks designed to incrementally 
push the Eighth Army south, through the destruction of company and battalion size units and 
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occupation of their positions.  Peng described the application of this tactic, “In such an attack, 
a part of the enemy–usually a battalion–was wiped out.  We fought many such battles – 
around four or five per month… Thus our troops won the initiative on the battlefield.”60  
Peng exaggerates; most of the CPVF attacks were against platoon and company positions and 
resulted in mixed results. 
        To accomplish this operational concept, Peng focused first on the security of his forces 
through the construction of an extensive series of underground fortifications that extended 
across the 150 mile long width of the Korean Peninsula and along the coasts because of the 
concern that the Eighth Army might conduct amphibious operations.  He bolstered these 
defenses with the addition of depth; CPVF field fortifications extended a minimum of ten 
miles to their rear.  These extensive and mostly underground fortification system protected 
Peng’s forces.61  Once secure behind this defensive barrier, the CPVF could then focus on 
night operations that targeted limited objectives that they could capture within the hours of 
darkness.   
        This created a narrow window for CPVF/KPA operations.  As soon as darkness ended 
the cost in lives and material became too great for the communists to maintain contact.  From 
July 1951 through July 1953, the CPVF dramatically increased its capability to employ 
artillery and mortars, in conjunction with night infantry assaults.
62
  The CPVF/KPA skillfully 
used coordinated artillery and night infantry assaults in attempts to push the U.N. line south 
and inflict unacceptable levels of casualties on U.N. forces.  Through these attrition tactics 
Peng planned to break the will of the U.N. leadership and force them to accede to communist 
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  This communist operational construct of “eating sticky candy,” forced the Eighth 
Army to adapt and adjust or suffer unacceptable losses.   
        In the summer of 1951, after Van Fleet’s successful repulse of the Fourth and Fifth 
Phase Offensives, the Truman administration decided it was time to end the conflict in Korea.  
Informal conversations between George Kennan and Soviet Ambassador to the U.N. Jakob 
Malik started a peace process.  On 5 June 1951 Malik told Kennan that his government 
wanted a peaceful conclusion to the conflict as quickly as possible.  Yet, his government 
would not take part in the ceasefire negations directly; instead that was the role of the 
Chinese and North Koreans.
64
  Despite Malik’s statements desiring “peace,” the leader of the 
Soviet Union, Joseph Stalin, did not want to end the war in Korea.  Instead he wanted to 
rehabilitate the “peace” image of international communism.  Armistice talks would serve this 
purpose and help to control the Americans, on a stage that played to Soviet strengths.
65
   
        In the summer of 1951 neither the PRC nor DPRK were willing to end the war.  They 
still believed in a military victory through attrition over U.N. forces, by late 1952 this 
changed with the PRC focused on securing the DPRK and weakening the ROK.  What 
Ridgway and Van Fleet feared the most came true.  The communist powers would use the 
armistice talks to check future U.N. advances and take the initiative.  Using the decreased 
military pressure to build up their defenses and increase their military capabilities.  Despite 
reservations, George Kennan advised the Truman administration to “grasp the nettle” and 
push for armistice negations in good faith.
66
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        The JCS 31 May 1951 directive effectively halted the war of maneuver and began the 
war of attrition.  After a year of fighting and tactical innovation, the Eighth Army had 
adapted offensive and maneuver concepts to overcome both KPA and CPVF concepts.  The 
Eighth Army held the line and restored the boundary of the Republic of Korea (ROK) 
roughly along the 38
th
 Parallel.  Now it had to adapt to a new mission.  While in a defensive 
stance, the Eighth Army was directed to force the communist forces, through static attrition, 
to sign an armistice that recognized the line of contact.   
        In July 1951, the U.S. and its U.N. allies wanted to end the war where it started, roughly 
along the 38
th
 Parallel.  Stalin’s goals revolved around weakening the U.S. economically and 
politically.  He believed a protracted war would show U.S. weakness to the rest of the world.  
Mao desired to continue the war so that he could win military industrial capability 
concessions from Stalin.  Mao also wanted to become the recognized leader of all communist 
activity in Asia.  He convinced Stalin to allow him to direct Communist operations in Japan, 
the Philippines, Viet Nam, Malaysia, Burma, and most importantly Indonesia.
 67
  The war in 
Korea gave Mao leverage over Stalin in these negotiations.   
        Until Mao achieved an organic modern China’s armament industry, he would not end 
the war in Korea.  Chang and Halliday quote a cable Mao set Stalin on 1 March 1951, “The 
Chinese army had already taken more than 100,000 casualties… and is expecting another 
300,000 this year and next.” “To sum up, Mao was ready to persist in a long-term war, to 
spend several years consuming several hundred thousand American lives, so they [U.N.] will 
back down… But Stalin must help him build a first-class army and arms industry.”68  These 
decisions set in motion two years of brutal attritional warfare along the MLR.  Neither the 
U.N. nor CPVF/KPA gained or lost an appreciable amount of territory.  
                                                          
67
 Zubok & Constantine, Inside the Kremlin’s Cold War, 66-72. 
68
 Chang & Halliday, The Unknown Story: Mao, 367-377. 
58 
 
        To demonstrate to the world that the U.S. desired peace, restrictive rules of engagement 
were placed on the Eighth Army commanders during the two years of negotiations.  Only if 
the MLR faltered could Eighth Army conduct large scale operations, as occurred in June and 
July of 1953 to stop the last CPVF offensive.  The commander for most of this period, 14 
April 1951 to 11 February 1953, was General James A. Van Fleet (West Point Class of 
1915).  Van Fleet was followed in command by General Maxwell D. Taylor (West Point 
Class of 1922), who commanded through the armistice on 27 July 1953. 
        Before negotiations began in July 1951, Ridgway sent instructions that limited the scope 
of combat that Van Fleet could conduct.  In that letter of instruction, dated 25 April 1951, the 
authorized limit of advance was the Wyoming Line.  The focus of military operations was 
“inflicting maximum personal casualties and material losses on hostile forces in Korea… 
acquisition of terrain in itself is of little or no value.”  Ridgway instructed Van Fleet to limit 
U.N. casualties, as much as possible.
69
  As two years of negotiations progressed, so did the 
restrictions on Eighth Army operations. 
        Van Fleet was directed to go no farther north than his current line of contact.  He could 
not conduct any amphibious landings to flank and encircle the enemy.  Over time any 
offensive operation using a battalion of infantry required approval from the U.N. commander, 
which was rarely given.  Even to retake a piece of ground with a force larger than a company 
required approval from the U.N commander.
70
  These restrictions greatly hindered the 
operational concepts Van Fleet could employ to bring pressure on the communist forces.  
       These restrictions and CPVF “eating sticky candy” operational concepts defined the 
options available to Van Fleet and his subordinate commanders.  Such changes in U.S. war 
                                                          
69
 Ibid., 164-168;183. 
70
 Hermes, Truce Tent and Fighting Front, 176 & 293. Ridgway directed Van Fleet to assume an 
“active defense.”  This order was also communicated to the JCS in MSG, CX 57143, CINCFE to JCS, 12 NOV 
51, DA-IN 18285.  Clark placed further restriction on combat operation in July of 1952, requiring his approval 
before any unit battalion or larger conducted an offensive maneuver.  This was placed in writing to Van Fleet in 
a Memo on 26 July 1952; Memo, Crawford for CofS, 26 July 1952, no subject, in UNC/FEC, Command Report, 
July 1952, CinC and CofS, Supporting Docs, tab 26. 
59 
 
aims did not come suddenly.  On 20 March 1951 a message from the JCS to then U.N. 
commander, MacArthur, stated that ground forces were not to cross the 38
th
 Parallel again, 
and that the U.S. and its allies were looking at options to end the fighting.
71
  As Ridgway 
explained, the main issue that led to MacArthur’s recall revolved around his frustration with 
officials in Washington, who in his view, refused to fight the communists.  MacArthur saw 
the future of world power shifting toward Asia.  Specifically he saw the battle for Korea as 
the central battle against world communism.  MacArthur believed that the U.S. needed to win 
the battle against Communism in Asia, not Europe.
72
  Ridgway paraphrased this: 
The future of the world, MacArthur believed, would be decided in Asia… 
What [MacArthur] envisioned was no less than the global defeat of 
Communism, dealing Communism “a blow from which it would never 
recover” and which would mark the historical turning back of the Red Tide.73   
 
        The conflict over strategic priorities was at the heart of the 1951 public debate in which  
MacArthur and Truman represented two different perspectives on how and where to fight 
communism.  NSC-68, supported by the Department of State and Defense and now Truman, 
outlined a defensive and attritional strategy that focused on building up the political and 
economic system of the free world.  NSC-68 was premised on a rejuvenated and allied 
Western Europe.  American foreign policy leadership was concerned about the possibility of 
the Soviet Union opening a second front and conquering Western Europe.  A spearhead of 
sixty Soviet divisions, based in Eastern Europe in the 1950s, could wash across Europe like a 
mechanized Red Wave.  These sixty Soviet divisions in Eastern Europe dominated the 
thinking of U.S. and Western European policy makers.
74
  Ridgway wrote:  
They (the U.S.) could not afford to lose the industrial skills, manpower, the 
technology, the mills and factories, the quickly exploitable raw materials, the 
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badly needed air bases, and above all the close ties of blood and culture – all 
these persuaded Washington that Europe must come first and Asia second.  
The loss of Western Europe would promptly and decisively tip the scales of 




        While serving as Second Army commander during the first year of the Korean War, Van 
Fleet realized that the focus on Europe was deeply imbedded in Washington D.C. and the 
Pentagon.  Van Fleet recalled “Europeanists” officers in Washington D.C. denigrating the 
conflict in Korea and resenting MacArthur.
76
  Korea reopened the divide between European 
and Asia focused officers and brought the debate between a defensive or offensive strategy 
against the Soviets into public debate.
77
 
       The conflict between the military commander in the field and political/military leaders in 
Washington increased as the strategy of Containment and limited war gained ascendency in 
Washington.  Washington political/military leaders were concerned that U.S. actions could 
start World War III.   MacArthur did not see the global conflict in these terms and voiced his 
opinion in a public manner.  His actions were viewed as a direct affront to Truman, who 
relived MacArthur of his commands, recalled him, and forced him to retire.
78
  The debate 
between a military victory and a diplomatic settlement ended.  The Eighth Army began the 




        When the NSC assessed Asia’s position in global security, it was within the perspective 
of protecting and integrating Japan, not with defending or developing Korea or other Asian 
countries.
80
  While the war in Korea continued, the JCS built the U.S. Seventh Army into a 
shield to protect Western Europe.  Building the armies of Western Europe and the Seventh 
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Army were given priority for quality men and fielding new equipment.
81
  NSC-68 outlined a 
military shield to protect Western Europe and other U.S. allies.  To build a military shield, it 
was necessary to build up military forces in Western Europe.
82
  In order to fund the military 
shield and wage the Cold War it was as necessary to gain public support as it was to build 
military capacity and capability.
83
  The ongoing Korean War and the CPVF/KPA refusal to 
agree to an armistice continued to get in the way of the JCS plans 
 
Blood: The Men 
        At the beginning of the Korean War it was necessary to send large quantities of veterans 
from WWII to Korea.  These were not enough to fill MacArthur’s divisions, so he employed 
Koreans through the Korean Augmentation to the U.S. Army (KATUSAs) program to fill the 
personnel gaps in U.S. Army units sent to fight in Korea.
84
  Once the crisis of the first few 
months passed, the U.S. Army produced enough soldiers to replace the reservists but not the 
KATUSAs.  It was considered necessary to return these double veterans back to civilian life.  
These demands played a part in the formalization of the individual rotation program in April 
of 1951.
85
  This was a system that rotated individual U.S. soldiers instead of U.S. Army units. 
        The individual rotation program for U.S. military personnel was approved by Ridgway 
before he became U.N. & Far East Commander, in April 1951.
86
  This policy developed into 
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a complex system of points assigned to each soldier, based on how long they served in Korea 
and where the soldier served in Korea.  More points were awarded to infantry and other 
soldiers assigned to battalions serving along the MLR.  Fewer points were given to support 
personnel and staff at Brigade and Division headquarters.  The fewest points were given to 
support troops and others not assigned to units along the MLR.  Point values were assigned 
based on relative danger of the soldier’s assignment.87  Infantry soldiers assigned along the 
MLR might only spend nine months in Korea, if their unit was on the MLR the entire time.  
An infantry soldier assigned to the Eighth Army staff might serve twelve or more months.  
Other support soldiers served as long as eighteen months to earn their 36 point ticket back to 
the U.S.
88
  A separate unit based system was created later for U.N. units.  
        From the U.S. Army perspective the rotation system was a net positive: officers and 
soldiers with recent combat experience were rotated to newly established units and infuse 
them with combat experience.  Rotation also allowed the entire U.S. Army to gain combat 




        The negative aspects of this system were more glaring but localized to Korea.  Rotation 
had a mixed effect on the morale of soldiers and officers.  Soldiers knew there was an end to 
their service in Korea, but the closer to their thirty-sixth point a soldier got, the less inclined 
they were to risk their thirty six point ticket home.
90
  Individual rotation degraded unit 
cohesion and the overall combat effectiveness of the Eighth Army.  Instead of units training 
together and then fighting as a team, units became a collection of individuals with varying 
levels of experience and commitment to the unit and mission based on their number of points.  
                                                          
87
 Mossman, Ebb and Flow, 365. 
88
 Fehrenbach, This Kind of War, 346-348. 
89
 Ridgway, The Korean War, 221; Marshall, Pork Chop Hill, 2,5; Braim, The Will to Win, 263-264; 
Casey, Selling the Korean War, 302-303. 
90
 John A. Sullivan, Toy Soldiers: Memoir of a Combat Platoon Leader in Korea (Jefferson: McFarland 
& Company, 1991), 115-117; Wilson, Maneuver and Firepower, 224.  
63 
 
This system affected infantry units along the MLR the most.  These units garrisoned the 
outposts, conducted the combat patrols, and took the casualties.  Every day after the rotation 
system was established the Eighth Army bled to maintain this hard earned combat 
experience.
91
   
        Commanders struggled to maintain the combat skills and offensive spirit of their soldiers 
and junior officers.  To counter these effects, the Eighth Army continually rotated units and 
employed a complex Rest and Recreation system.  A regiment would normally only spend six 
weeks on the line and then rotate into a two to three week training cycle.
92
  The creation of 
the individual rotation system in Korea outlasted the war.  It continues through to the present 
in U.S. forces assigned to the ROK, and served as the model for the rotation of soldiers 
during the Viet Nam War. 
        For all the advantages and problems of the individual rotation policy, the major issue 
that faced the Eighth Army remained a lack of manpower.  The shortage of men required the 
continuation of the KATUSA program.  KATUSAs started untrained Koreans infused into 
U.S. Army units and over time improved into valuable members of each unit.
93
  Unlike their 
American counterparts there was no rotation home for the KATUSAs, so those that survived 
developed a great deal of combat skill.
94
  In the April 1953 battle for Pork Chop Hill, out of 




        The integration of Koreans into the U.S. Army as combatants was unique to Korea and 
the Korean War.  The number of KATUSAs in a unit varied throughout the war and helped 
fill out and maintain the strength of U.S. Army and eventually other U.N. forces.  
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Approximately 20-25% of the soldiers in a U.S. Army infantry company were KATUSAs.  
KATUSAs also helped familiarize U.S. Army soldiers with the Koreans they were fighting 
for, which also had mixed results.
96
  As with the rotation policy, the KATUSA policy 
continues to this day, with modifications.  It serves the same purpose of filling out under 
strength units assigned to the Eighth Army in Korea.  Currently each nine-man infantry squad 
has at least one KATUSA, with an average of four to six KATUSAs per infantry platoon.
97
  
As the Korean War continued, it remained a fight to keep Eighth Army units at required 
combat strength and readiness. 
        Van Fleet and his subordinate commanders had to adapt their operational concepts to 
this individual rotation process, the shortage of trained soldiers and the lack of additional 
combat units to counter the growth of CPVF/KPA forces.  The personnel rotation policy, 
coupled with the adoption of the Containment strategy, hampered effective defensive 
operational concepts.  CPVF/KPA operational concept of “eating sticky candy” challenged 
the Eighth Army’s daylight focused concepts and forced Eighth Army to become night 
fighters.  The other factor that affected Eighth Army concepts was the military equipment 
available to prosecute the conflict.  
 
Sprockets: Equipping Eighth Army to defend 
        The equipment that soldiers in Korea used varied as the war progressed.  As 
experimental equipment was introduced into the conflict, U.S. units developed ways to 
employ them in a defensive conflict.  New weapons were developed because of the Korean 
War build up.  Much of the individual equipment used was WWII vintage or upgrades.  The 
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individual weapon systems remained the M-1 (Garand), M-1 carbine family (M-1, M1A1, 
M2, & M3), the M1928A1 Thompson submachine gun, and the M1918 Browning Automatic 
Rifle (BAR).
98
  The M2 and M3 were developed at the end of WWII and were supposed to 
replace the M1928A1, but when the Korean War started this exchange was not complete, and 
the M1928A1 remained in use throughout the war.  The deficiencies of the M-1 and M-1 
carbine family during the Korean War resulted in the decision to design a new rifle for the 
U.S. Army infantry soldier.  This resulted in the development of the M-14 and M-16 weapon 
systems that are still in use today.  The primary side arm of the U.S. armed forces was the M-
1911 .45 caliber pistol.
99
   
        The M-1 and M-1 carbine were the primary weapons taken on patrol during the trench 
warfare period of the war.  The M-1 was a more dependable weapon but the carbine had a 
greater volume of fire.
100
  M-1 carbines used a twenty or thirty round external magazine 
unlike the M-1 Garand which used an eight round internal clip.  The M-1 Carbine fired in 
semi-automatic or automatic mode.  The M3 variant included both day and night scopes.  It 
was the first U.S. rifle to use a night vision device, referred to as a sniper scope or 
“snooperscope.”  It was developed for WWII but saw limited use at the end of the war in 
Europe, specifically in Airborne and Ranger units.  The M-3 was also sent to the Pacific for 
use in the Philippine and Okinawa campaigns.
101
   
        During the trench warfare phase, night patrols became the primary activity of infantry 
units, the M-3 with night scope was a desired weapon within a patrol and for outpost duty.
102
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This weapon, like other weapons, was constantly upgraded and tested on combat patrols.  
Lieutenant Sullivan recounted a patrol, 14-15 February 1953, where his men were ordered to 
take a new version out on an ambush patrol and provide feedback.
103
  The Korean War forced 
the Army to develop soldier portable night vision capabilities to assist in night fighting.  
        The biggest change in soldier equipment was the fielding and mandatory wear of flak 
jackets.  The M1952A flak vest was a great innovation that added weight to the soldiers load 
but protected him against the two biggest threats in Korea, artillery and grenade fragments.  
The armored vest or flak vest M1952A, Navy and Army variant, was adopted by Eighth 
Army in the fall of 1952.   
        The use of the flak vest by front line troops reduced fatal chest wounds by 60 to 70 
percent, according to numerous Army Medical Department studies conducted during the 
Korean War.
104
  The use of the M1952A body armor reduced the severity of the remaining 
chest wounds by 25 percent.  Along with saving lives it was noted that body armor increased 
the individual soldier’s sense of safety and willingness to fight.105  The extensive use of body 
armor in the last year of the Korean War began to change the way the Army and Marine 
Corps viewed the equipping of infantry soldiers.  Fighting outnumbered, in a limited 
attritional war, of undetermined length, the U.S. Army’s most precious resource became 
trained soldiers.  No longer were infantry soldiers disposable, they became indispensable.   
        One weapon that dominated the Korean War was artillery.  During the Korean War 
more artillery rounds were fired by the U.S. Army than it fired during WWII.
106
  Eighth 
Army used five types of artillery and four types of mortars.  The volume and accuracy from 
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improved artillery tubes and accurate fire direction systems made the difference during many 
defensive attritional hill fights in Korea.
107
  Fehrenbach  quotes S.L.A. Marshall: 
While the enemy had an estimated number of field guns equal to those of the 
U.N., it was the American volume of fire, hurled without stint or counting, and 
its superior placement, that enabled the U.N. to win almost all the hill battles 




        In Van Fleet’s “opinion, by WWII standards, his Army’s artillery was short by some 70 
battalions.”  It was his intent to “expend steel and fire, not men.”109  Van Fleet demanded 
massive increases in the per day artillery tube expenditure.  For example, in May 1952, 710 
active tubes fired 102,000 total rounds of artillery and in July 1953, 900 tubes fired 375,000 
total rounds of artillery to stop the last CPVF offensive.  Daily rates of fire per-gun were 
increased from WWII rates of 50 rounds a day to 300 rounds a day for a 105mm howitzer.
110
  
For example, “in one operation, the 38th Field Artillery Battalion fired 11,600 rounds in 12 
hours, a rate of one round per minute per 105mm howitzer.”111   
        Korea was also the first time the field artillery arm employed the grid reference targeting 
system, which increased the accuracy and speed of fire missions.  This simplified system 
enabled any infantrymen to call accurate fire missions.
112
  The Korean War was also the first 
war where the USAF was a separate service.  This caused issues with respect to CAS.  The 
Korean War was the first war to employ the newly created USAF Tactical Air Control Parties 
(TACP), which were sent down to companies and platoons, to provide close air support 
terminal guidance.
113
   
        Operation SMACK, a January 1953 experiment in air-armor-artillery-infantry 
coordination, demonstrated the strengths and weaknesses of air power and massed fire in 
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support of an infantry assault in daylight on a prepared position.  The assault on Spud Hill 
used one infantry company minus (two platoons).  That company received massive amounts 
of artillery preparation and close air support along with direct fire from tanks during the 
assault.  Despite 224,000 pounds of bombs, 12,000 rounds of artillery, 4,500 rounds of 
mortars, and over 100,000 rounds of machine gun fire, the infantry assault was a “fiasco” and 
Spud Hill was not taken due to a lack of infantry to drive the final assault.
114
  Despite this 
setback, the Army, Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps continued to improve its fire support 
systems.  These changes increased the precision and integration of U.S. Army fire support 
systems. But fire support alone could not dislodge a well-entrenched enemy.  Only quantities 
of good infantrymen could perform this task.  
        Two other weapons systems employed and refined during the Korean War, were 
helicopters and armored personnel carriers (APC).  The Korean War was the first combat test 
of the helicopter and APC.  Both systems were experimented with during WWII but never 
employed in combat.  The U.S. Marine Corps took the lead with the development of 
helicopter tactics, with the full support of Ridgway and Van Fleet.
115
  Both generals saw the 
utility and potential and requested Army transport helicopters for Korea.  Despite the need, 
Army transport helicopters did not arrive in Korea until 1953.  In contrast U.S. Army 
command and medical evacuation helicopters were extensively used throughout the conflict 
starting in late 1950.
116
   
         An example of the early use of command helicopters was when X Corps Commander, 
Major General Ned Almond, used his helicopter as a mobile command and control platform 
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during the 23 May 1951 Task Force Gerhardt counterattack to regain the Soyang River 
crossing.  With his knowledge of the battlefield, Almond landed next to the lead tank element 
and ordered them to start movement.  Task Force Gerhardt fought through and quickly 
captured or destroyed several Chinese units and regained twelve miles of mountainous 
terrain.
117
  By using helicopter reconnaissance, Almond could interact directly with his 
commanders and use his authority to modify plans and take advantage of a fortuitous 
situation.   
        As outposts increased along the MLR, secure movement of men and supplies to them 
became a problem that helicopters helped solve, but helicopters had to land just short of the 
MLR.  Movement from the MLR to the outposts required a new way to use armored forces.  
New and old tanks were used in innovative ways to support the infantry and conduct long 
range attacks on CPVF positions.  The Korean War saw the first extensive use of heavy 
tanks, the M-26 Pershing, followed by the M-46, M-47, and M-48 Patton tanks by the U.S. 
Army.
118
  Though 200 of the test variant of the M-26, the T-26E3, saw limited action starting 
in February 1945 in Europe, it was deemed “too little, too late” to have any effect or gain 
experience with the weapon system.
119
  These tanks increased the fire power, 
maneuverability, and protection available to the infantry-armor team.  These tank positions 
became a critical factor along the MLR.  Instead of leading armored spearheads they became 
high-powered snipers that could destroy enemy bunkers and machine gun positions across no 
man’s land.120   
        The M-39 was the first APC in combat.  It was designed to carry supplies and personnel 
to forward positions.  Its drawback was its lack of overhead cover.  Later, the experimental T-
18E1, with an enclosed top, was developed.  Major General Arthur G. Trudeau, commander 
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 Infantry Division, advocated for the employment of APCs in support of infantry 
operations.  He convinced Eighth Army to allow him to conduct field tests of the T-18E1.  
The M-39 was used during the April 1953 battle for Pork Chop Hill.  Both M-39’s and T-
18E1’s provided the critical support link between Hill 200 and Pork Chop Hill during the 
July 1953 battle.
121
  APCs proved capable of protecting and transporting soldiers from the 
MLR to outposts under attack.  Simultaneously, they were used to evacuate casualties and 
resupply the forces in the outpost.  The June 1953 battle of Pork Chop Hill was more of a 
siege, and the APC was crucial in breaking that siege and bringing re-supply to the position.  
Trudeau’s advocacy and their performance during both battles for Pork Chop Hill ensured 
their further development after the Korean War.  These developments resulted in the M-59 




        Fighting in the Korean War was dynamic with operational concepts continuing to 
change during each period of the war.  The “man over machine” concept the CPVF initially 
presented U.N. forces with several challenges.  As Eighth Army adapted to overcome 
Communist “man over machine” concepts, the Communist created the operational concept of 
“eating sticky candy” to thwart Eighth Army adaptations.  The give and take of the first year 
of the Korean War demonstrated the caliber of the opponents.  Offensive war of movement 
favored the better equipped and supplied Eighth Army. This was demonstrated during the 
pursuit that followed the failure of the Second Phase of the Fifth Offensive in May of 1951. 
        The options available to Van Fleet in May 1951 were limited by JCS directives, the 
resources available in men and equipment, and the operational concepts employed by Peng 
and the CPVF/KPA.  As General J. Lawton Collins, U.S. Army Chief of Staff (1949-1953), 
later wrote:  
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During this period (June 1951 – July 1953) the main purpose of the U.N. 
operations was to keep the pressure on the enemy and to inflict maximal 
casualties on the Chinese and the North Koreans in order to force an 




To achieve this operational goal Van Fleet could neither advance nor retreat.  The U.S. Army 
would not provide him with any additional units.  He was also ordered to minimize U.N. 
casualties.  The communist forces refused to give battle and focused on limited night assaults 
that would only target U.N. squad, platoon or company size positions.  Within these 
constraints, Van Fleet changed the operational concepts employed by his army in order to 
achieve the required goal: an end to the fighting along the MLR. 
        The situation that faced Van Fleet in July 1951 demanded innovative leadership to keep 
his army combat capable, while conducting a defensive and attritional limited war.  Van 
Fleet’s army was outnumbered fighting a war it was not designed or equipped for.  To 
overcome these challenges, Van Fleet and his subordinate commanders adopted different 
operational concepts to accomplish their mission.  These concepts employed by Van Fleet 
and his subordinates changed the way the Eighth Army fought the last two years of the 
Korean War.  They were supported by new and innovative weapons and support systems.   
        The greatest challenge was to modify and employ weapon systems designed for mobile 
offensive warfare.  The most important of these was the U.S. soldier.  Van Fleet needed to 
harness them to conduct effective defensive attritional warfare.  To do this required 
operational concepts that allowed Eighth Army to apply pressure on the CPVF/KPA while 
not gaining ground, limiting U.S. casualties, and not provoking the Soviets to either enter the 
Korean War or start a second front in Europe.  This was the balance the Eighth Army 
managed, starting from June 1951.   
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Chapter 4: Korean War Trench warfare: Small Unit Tactics, Precision Fires, and 
Special Operations.  
On 12 November 1951, General Van Fleet was ordered to end the methodical advance 
of Operation PILE DRIVER and assume the “active defense” along the Eighth Army’s 
current front line.  He was authorized by General Ridgway to commit forces up to a division 
size formation to take control of an enemy outpost or adjust his defensive line.  From his 
current limit of advance, Van Fleet was required to convince the CPVF/KPA to cease combat 
operations.
1
  Ridgway’s order to Van Fleet nailed the Eighth Army’s feet in place for the 
duration of the Korean War.
2
 
        In contrast, Peng Dehuai convinced Chairman Mao Zedong that his forces could not 
defeat the Eighth Army using “men over weapons” operational concepts.3  Unable to 
convince Stalin to commit his Red Army to the fight in Korea, Mao directed Peng to conduct 
an operational concept called “eating sticky candy.”  This concept was focused on weakening 
the political will of the free world so it would abandon the Republic of Korea.
4
   
        Van Fleet’s challenge was to end the war, minimize casualties and secure the ROK 
roughly along the Main Line of Resistance (MLR).
5
  During Van Fleet’s tenure as 
commander of the Eighth Army, April 1951 to February 1953, he and his subordinate 
commanders developed defensive attritional concepts that allowed Eighth Army to hold the 
MLR outnumbered by the CPVF/KPA forces.  When Van Fleet handed over command to 
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General Maxwell D. Taylor in February 1953, Taylor refined Van Fleet’s operational 
concepts throughout the remainder of the Korean War.   
        Van Fleet and Taylor employed three internal U.S. Army operational concepts that 
changed how the Eighth Army fought along the MLR.  These were: improved small unit 
tactics, precision fire support, and special operations.  Van Fleet adapted to the restrictions on 
offensive action.  First he increased command emphasis on small unit tactics, especially 
“patrolling.”6  Second, he increased all forms of fire support down to the small unit leaders, 
this built on his previous directives and liberal use of firepower beginning in May and June of 
1951.
7
  Third, Eighth Army was confronted by a persistent communist guerrilla force south of 
the 38
th
 Parallel and a refugee population willing to take the fight north.  To counter 
communist special operations and employ their own, Far East Command (FEC) and Eighth 
Army created a full spectrum special operations capability.  This force focused on special 
operations designed to apply indirect pressure on CPVF/KPA forces, especially their flanks 
and supply lines.  Special operations were designed to force Peng to divert manpower and 
resources away from the front lines to protect his flanks and rear.
8
  These three operational 
concepts defined Eighth Army operations in Korea during the static period from June 1951 to 
27 July 1953. 
        Before the Korean War, the U.S. armed forces hotly debated the relative value of each 
service and the nature of future armed conflict.
9
  This debate, in simplest terms, concerned 
the importance of men versus machines.  The advocates of machines, in the form of advanced 
technology, resided mainly in the U.S. Air Force and Navy while the defenders of the 
primacy of the soldier came largely from the U.S. Army and Marine Corps.  One can view 
the Korean War as a test case for these two perspectives on warfare.  As Chief of Staff of the 
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Army, Ridgway challenged Admiral Arthur W. Radford, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff, “He [Ridgway] disputed the contention that improved weapons constituted a reason for 
reducing military manpower.”10  In contrast, the Korean conflict was written off as irrelevant 
by the advocates of air power and atomic technology, because these technologies were not 
fully employed due to political restrictions.
11
  But the importance of the soldier was 
supported by the numerous small unit actions, and increased use of CAS, during combat 
operations from the summer of 1951 through July 1953.
12
 
        Van Fleet’s operational changes were influenced by stark realizations concerning the 
nature of the struggle between the communists and the free world.  The first realization 
concerned basic numbers.  Communist combat formations outnumbered the free world 
formations by a ratio of two to one in Korea.
13
  Besides their population advantage, it was 
apparent that the communists were willing to spend the lives of their people more freely.  
Stalin told Zhou Enlai in 1952, Mao’s number two, “The North Koreans have lost nothing, 
except for casualties.”14   
        The second operational realization concerned the nature of the battlefield.  During the 
Korean War the battlefield expanded to include what is now understood as Special 
Operations.  Special Operations in the form of propaganda, psychological operations, civil 
action, and partisan forces operating deep in the enemy’s rear were an established part of 
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  Korean and to a lesser degree Chinese soldiers quickly discarded their 
uniforms and became guerrillas once caught behind U.N. lines and resulted in approximately 
8,000 guerrillas operating behind Eighth Army lines in November 1951.
16
  This realization 
militarized most U.S. activities in Korea and resulted in counter-guerrilla operations like 
RATKILLER.   
        The third realization concerned the world that the U.S. wanted to create and protect with 
its military shield.  Operationally the U.S. military alliance required increased coordination, 
integration, and standardization.  Each member of the U.N. Command arrived at a different 
level of readiness.  The Turks were well trained soldiers, but required a complete change of 
equipment and were then organized along U.S. Army T/O&E for a Regimental Combat 
Team.  In contrast, the Thai Battalion required intensive training along with a complete issue 
of clothes and equipment and reorganization into a U.S. T/O&E style unit.
17
  The new official 
relationships, NATO and later SEATO along with numerous bi-lateral alliances, required a 
drastic upgrading of the military forces of the weaker states, so that all forces could work 
effectively together against the Communists.
18
  This understanding forced the U.S. Army to 
change the way it fought and to integrate other U.N. forces into the Army system.   
 
Small Unit Tactics 
        Small Unit Tactics (SUT) is a term used to describe U.S. military actions by units below 
the regiment or brigade level; where the battalion, company, platoons or squad serves as the 
unit that conducts a combat mission.  Due to their size, these units focus on specific tactical 
tasks within a limited geographical area.  Their tasks are divided into defensive and offensive 
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missions.  In the defense, these units can conduct positional or active defense.  In the offense, 
they can conduct planned or hasty attacks, raids, reconnaissance patrols, ambushes and 
movement to contact.  The heart of small unit tactics revolves around the concept of 
patrolling.  This is a tactic performed when a unit is on the offense or defense.  Patrolling 
consists of three types of tactical missions: reconnaissance, ambushes, and raids.  During the 
trench warfare period, the focus of every Eighth Army maneuver unit was patrolling focused 
on gaining information about the enemy, capturing enemy prisoners, dominating no-man’s 
land, and inflicting damage on enemy units or positions.  Aggressive patrolling by every unit 
on the MLR was one way Van Fleet could apply pressure on the communists.  
        As the war developed, more restrictions were placed on the conduct of offensive 
operations.  In July 1952, the new FEC and U.N. Commander, General Mark W. Clark, 
reserved authority to authorize any operation of battalion size or greater.
19
  Only he could 
authorize an operation that involved a battalion or greater forces.  The last of these major 
operations was Operation SHOWDOWN in October 1952.
20
  The operation was too costly 
for Clark’s taste and future battalion or larger operations were shelved.  Clark’s view was that 
the best way to punish the enemy was to allow the Communists take the offensive into the 
teeth of U.N. firepower.
21
  
        Prior to the Korean War, patrolling tactics supported U.S. Army offensive and defensive 
operations.  They were not considered the primary task of an infantry unit but a supporting 
task.  At the beginning of the Korean War the Army had just published an updated field 
manual for infantry companies.
22
  FM 7-10 Rifle Company Infantry Regiment (October 1949) 
covered squad, platoon and company operations.
23
  Similar to FM 100-5 Operations (1949), 
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the rifle company manual describes the tactical role of the rifle company in offense, defense, 
and retrograde operations.
24
  As with FM 100-5 Operations, the focus of the rifle company 
was to attack, and to support larger units in the attack.  Defensive operations were defined as 
temporary: designed to gain time, degrade the enemy offensive capability, and support the 
buildup of combat power before the army returned to offensive operations.  Smaller units 
(Squads, Platoons, Companies, & Battalions) supported maneuver warfare through patrolling, 
and performed defensive tactics to prepare for the next major attack.
25
  In the last two years 
of the Korean War this relationship switched and patrolling became the primary task of every 
unit stationed along the MLR.  For example, in January 1953 IX Corps dispatched 2,668 
platoon sized night patrols.
26
 
        By November 1951, U.S. Army operational doctrine focused on offensive maneuver 
missions lost validity in Korea because of the order to go on the “active defense,” and later 
“General Clark wanted the U.N. Command to confine itself to patrolling and let the enemy do 
the attacking.”27  FM 7-10 Rifle Company Infantry Regiment underwent extensive 
amendment at the end of 1952; the Army recognized the need for a revised tactical doctrine 
for its rifle companies.
28
  Some of the major doctrinal changes emphasized the proper 
conduct of raids, employment of squad snipers, detailed fire support planning, and the 
incorporation of close air support (CAS) into company fire support plans.  Previously the 
planning of CAS was the responsibility of regiment and battalion headquarters, but during 
and after the Korean War it became the responsibility of company commanders.
29
  Only 
company commanders and platoon leaders could effectively call CAS during CPVF/KPA 
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night assaults or Eighth Army raids on CPVF/KPA strong points.  Regimental and battalion 
commanders could only provide support to their company commanders and platoon leaders 
engaged with the enemy.   
        To deal with the perceived bottomless pit of communist manpower, the U.S Army 
concluded that it needed to increase the quality and quantity of firepower throughout its 
formations.  The CPVF/KPA forces also needed more firepower, but for a different reason, 
because they could not break through U.N. lines.  Communist leaders solved their firepower 
dilemma through traditional means: they built more fire support units.
30
   
        In contrast, the U.S. Army increased the lethality of each battalion by replacing rifles 
with additional automatic weapons.  In 1952 the U.S. Army increased the number of 
automatic rifles (Browning Automatic Rifle or BAR) in its platoons from three to six, 
allocating two BAR’s per squad and one sniper system per squad with night scope.  Due to 
supply reasons most units had only two sniper systems per platoon.
31
  In May and December 
1952, and April 1953, changes to the Army Table of Organization and Equipment increased 
the size of the rifle platoon from 41 to 45 soldiers and authorized an increase in weapon 
systems.  Each battalion also increased the number of M1917A6 Light Machine Guns (LMG) 
from 13 to 21, doubling the number of LMGs in each platoon.
32
  The additional automatic 
weapons increased each platoons potential volume of fire during engagements. 
        During combat patrols, or raids in current military terminology, platoons were 
augmented with special weapons, like the M2-2 flamethrower and M20 75mm recoilless rifle, 
to knockout communist bunkers and machine-gun positions.  Near the end of the war, 
battalion weapons platoons added M27 105mm recoilless rifles to their set of weapon 
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systems.  After the Korean War these were replaced with the more effective M40 106mm 
recoilless rifle as the primary U.S. Army battalion anti-tank system, until the fielding of 
BGM-71 TOW systems in the 1970s.
33
  To increase the firepower of each platoon position, 
additional light, medium, and heavy machine guns were attached to infantry platoons that 
manned outposts.  The increase in machine guns at the lowest level increased the requirement 
for ammunition to feed the guns.   
        Mortar systems proved indispensable and were upgraded throughout the Korean War.  
The M2 60mm mortar was replaced by the improved trigger capable M19 60mm mortar.  M1 
81mm mortars were replaced by the longer ranged M29 81mm mortar.  Similarly, the M2 
4.2in Mortar was replaced by the longer ranged M30 4.2in Mortar.  These new mortar 
systems increased the range, accuracy, and lethality of each company, battalion and 
regiment’s indirect fire capability.34  Improved mortar systems facilitated increased organic 
fire support to units on patrol.   
        By summer 1951, the Army recognized the need to strengthen the leadership of junior 
officers and non-commissioned officers (NCO) in the employment of SUT, particularly 
patrolling in the form of reconnaissance, ambushes and raids.
35
  The Chief of Staff of the 
Army transferred the Ranger Training Command to the Infantry School, and renamed it the 
Ranger Department, on 10 October 1951.
36
  After the Korean War, Ridgway set the goal of a 
Ranger qualified officer in each infantry company and a Ranger qualified NCO in every 
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  This remained the goal of the U.S. Army but was rarely achieved, due to 
the high failure rate in the Ranger course.   
        During the Korean War, the primary way to learn patrolling skills consisted of training 
exercises behind the MLR, rehearsals prior to patrols, and combat patrols in no-man’s land.38  
During the “war of patrols,” 1951 to 1953, the harshest graders of patrol leaders were the 
inscrutable CPVF.  The institutionalization of Ranger school was designed to increase the 
Army’s ability to conduct SUT patrol activities, at night.  The course taught junior officers 
and NCOs leadership skills and honed their combat techniques in the execution of 
reconnaissance, ambush, and raid patrols during day or night.  As an institutional change, 
Ranger school was a long-term fix to the Army’s deficiency in patrol skills.   
        Due to battlefield attrition and the rotation system, most junior officers only served four 
to six months in company level positions before they were rotated into staff jobs, or KMAG 
billets.  This hindered the development of capable patrol leaders. The rotation policy applied 
to the regular soldier and NCOs, but soldiers stayed with their units for the duration of their 
tour.    
        For example, the 65
th
 Infantry Regiment rotated 8,700 men, 1,500 of them NCOs, 
between January and September 1952, and only received 435 trained NCO replacements.  
Colonel Cordero, the regimental commander, reported that out of 811 authorized NCO 
positions in the upper three grades (master sergeant, sergeant first class and sergeant) he had 
only 381 within his command.  This situation forced commanders to grow their own NCOs; 
these internally developed NCOs were soldiers that demonstrated leadership potential.
39
  
High rates of turnover, along with the high casualty rate of among junior officers and NCOs 
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during combat operations, created the largest hurdle to increasing the patrolling proficiency 
of the U.S. Army during the Korean War.
40
   
        S.L.A. Marshall described the rotation system on the MLR in April 1953:  
On the American side, men moved in and out as if the fighting line operated 
on a conveyer belt.  No one stayed long enough to graduate in the fine art of 
deception.
41
   
 
There were two ways off the “conveyer belt” as a casualty or once a soldier earned the 
required number of points.  While on the MLR, most units were constantly shifting positions.  
A battalion would normally spend about six weeks on the MLR and then rotate back to 
regimental or division reserve position for two weeks.  During those two weeks the 
companies would receive replacement soldiers, and conduct individual and collective training 
that culminated in a company live fire attack with support arms.  After these training weeks 
off the line, the battalion would return and cycle through the MLR for approximately six 
more weeks.  Battalions and regiments were also rotated to perform other tasks, including 
securing POW camps and key infrastructure throughout South Korea.
42
  This shifting of tasks 
diminished the patrolling skills of each infantry company.
43
 
      While on the MLR, companies rotated through various positions.  The MLR consisted of 
three parts:  the COPL (Combat Outpost Line), the MLR itself, and reserve positions behind 
the MLR. The area behind the MLR was where support units and headquarters operated.  
Each battalion manned one to three outposts in front of the MLR; this constituted their 
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section of the COPL.  These outposts developed into platoon and company size fortified 
hilltops.   
        The larger outposts had fortified squad sized supporting positions that controlled 
avenues of approach to the primary fortification and the MLR.  Platoons would rotate 
between positions on the MLR and the COPL every three to seven days, based on the 
company and battalion schedule.  Therefore an average platoon would spend one third of its 
time on the MLR occupying an outpost if its battalion had three points on the COPL.  As the 
war developed, not all battalions occupied three points; some only maintained one outpost 
and focused the rest of their platoons on patrolling.
44
    
        Due to Van Fleet’s patrolling requirements, each subordinate unit maintained a patrol 
schedule and reported them in their monthly command reports.  Each patrol consisted of a 
platoon or smaller force tailored to the requirements of the patrol.  Because of the number of 
patrols in a regimental sector, patrol routes and missions were controlled at the regimental 
level, and supervised by battalion commanders.  Each company on average conducted one 
patrol a night.  This patrol assignment was rotated between the company’s three rifle 
platoons.  Most patrols were screening patrols that were focused on detecting CPVF/KPA 
patrols and night attacks, but a select number were combat patrols.
45
  In modern terminology, 
screening patrols were either reconnaissance patrols or ambush patrols.  Combat patrols were 
raids focused on communist outposts or the opposing MLR.  When a unit served as a local 
reserve they were usually tasked with conducting specialty patrols for that command.
46
   
        Van Fleet pushed to increase patrolling across the entire MLR.  Therefore every night in 
the no-man’s land between the U.N. and communist forces there were hundreds of U.N. and 
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Communist patrols conducting reconnaissance, ambushes, and raids on each other.
47
  In the 
summer of 1951 the Army patrolled mainly during the day, but as the fronts became fortified 
in late 1951 most of the patrols began taking place at night.  Some patrols still took place 
during the day, while others would last longer than one period of darkness.  As the two MLRs 
and COPLs crept closer together, and the communists increased their firepower, it became 
catastrophic to conduct almost any missions in daylight. 
        One of the major deficiencies of the 1948 and later 1953 TO&E was the lack of sizable 
specialized reconnaissance capability within the U.S. Army units.  Neither Eighth Army 
headquarters nor its corps headquarters possessed organic reconnaissance capability based on 
the 1948 or 1953 TO&E.  To solve this deficiency, Eighth Army created within the 
Miscellaneous Division of Eighth Army G-3 Operations Attrition Section. Within the 
Miscellaneous Division, Eighth Army created the 8086 Army Unit (AU) that conducted 
special reconnaissance and other special operations missions.
 48
  Reconnaissance units were 
organic to division and below units.  By TO&E, each division had one reconnaissance 
company and each regiment had one reconnaissance platoon.  A battalion had an intelligence 
section that consisted of an intelligence officer and two squads of two men each, who were 
supposed to perform both reconnaissance and analysis tasks for the battalion.
49
  This structure 
provided a specialized capability to support Army divisions, but not the capacity to conduct 
enough patrols to dominate no-man’s land, or collect the specialized information needed by 
U.S. commanders.
50
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        Through sheer volume of patrols, Eighth Army soldiers increased their capability to 
patrol at night.  Only a small portion of the enlisted soldiers remained in the Army after their 
two-year conscription and those that did were shipped back to the U.S. to serve as trainers for 
the next iteration of conscripts.
51
  Training Bulletin No. 8, November 1951, listed ten specific 
weaknesses of the U.N. forces that were found in a CPVF document.  This CPVF critique of 
U.N. soldiers focused on their weaknesses in individual and collective soldier skills.  They 
criticized the U.N. forces dependence on vehicles, fire support, and lack of physical fitness to 
cope with Korean terrain.  Van Fleet stated that the errors noted by the CPVF “indicate 
practices that are to be avoided in future actions.”52   
        During the first few months of fighting between the CPVF and U.N. forces, the CPVF 
saw a willingness on the part of U.N. forces to abandon their equipment and an inability to 
effectively conduct operations at night.
53
  Despite this initial assessment, by the end of the 
Korean War, according to Bin Yu, a PLA veteran, CPVF commanders found it harder and 
harder to attack U.S. positions, either outposts or along the MLR as the war went on.  The 
CPVF improved its forces to adapt to U.S. firepower and maneuverability, but Bin Yu relates 
the assessment of CPVF leaders, that the U.S. Army also “improved steadily and 
significantly.”54 
        In 1954, the U.S. Army Infantry School published its own Lessons from Korea.  The 
Infantry School report noted deficiencies in the infantry soldiers similar to those noted in the 
1951 CPVF assessment.  The Infantry School found 37 areas that infantry units could 
improve upon.  The report focused on the need to improve basic soldiering skills, train 
soldiers to correctly operate and employ infantry weapon systems, operate at night, conduct 
proper patrolling, incorporation of all forms of fire support, and the need for realistic training.  
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During and after the Korean War, the Infantry School focused on improving the patrolling 
skills of infantry soldiers and leaders.  They also added a helicopter unit to the Infantry 
School, to support incorporating helicopters into its training of infantry soldiers.
55
  SUT skills 
were an identified weakness of the U.S. Army throughout the Korean War, and were the 
focus of post-war training. 
 
Fire Support 
        Fehrenbach described the last two years of the Korean War as a protracted artillery 
duel.
56
  In many ways this was correct, but it glosses over the nature of the Clausewitz style 
duel that occurred between the Eighth Army and CPVF/KPA forces.  From the U.S. 
perspective the U.S. Army and Marine Corps continued to refine the concept that Ridgway 
described as “Find, Fix, Fight, and Finish.”  In current military terminology the fight was 
dropped to become “Find, Fix and Finish,” or the three F’s.57  The finding and fixing of the 
CPVF/KPA forces was the responsibility of patrols and outposts that lured out communist 
units.  The finishing was a predominantly direct and indirect fire responsibility of the heavy 
weapons along the MLR, artillery behind the MLR, and the CAS capability of U.S. Air 
Force, Navy, and Marine aviation units.  The close relationship between the infantry small 
unit leader, their Forward Observer (FOs) teams, and the various fire support units melded 
into a purer form of combined arms.  
       Based on John J. McGrath’s study of the development of fire support, a lesson learned 
from WWII, the company Fire Support Officer (FSO) concept was formalized and 
implemented during the Korean War.
58
  This gave each company commander his own FSO to 
help him with his company fire support plan.   The November 1950 changes to FM 7-10 Rifle 
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Company Infantry Regiment dealt with the correct employment of internal infantry company 
assets; it focused on 60mm mortars and 57mm recoilless rifles, and the development of squad 
leaders.   
        The December 1952 changes to FM 7-10 Rifle Company Infantry Regiment, focused on 
order preparation and the synchronization of fires, in support of company attack or defensive 
operations.  They included an entire new section to the supporting fires appendix dealing with 
the characteristics, capabilities and employment of CAS.
59
  In Training Bulletin No. 8, 
November 1951, the employment of tanks in support of infantry in the defense was 
highlighted, advising infantry commanders on how to employ tanks in their defensive 
positions to maximize their capability.
60
  Each of these changes indicated a shift in the 
employment of fire support and the closer relationship between different types of soldiers in 
the U.S. Army.     
        Lieutenant General Edward M. Almond, as Commandant of the Army War College, 
produced a paper titled Battle Employment of Artillery in Korea (February & March 1952) 
and conducted a Conference on United Nations Military Operations in Korea, in the same 
month, with the faculty and students of the U.S. Army War College.
61
  He took this briefing 
to the Artillery Center at Fort Sill and other U.S. Army schools, to advocate increased 
synchronization of fire support and CAS.  The Battle Employment of Artillery in Korea dealt 
with how he integrated all forms of fire support during the Battle of Soyang River (16-23 
May 1951), and gives advice on how the field artillery branch should continue to develop.
62
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        In his cover letter to the Commandant of The Artillery School, Almond stated that he 
was most concerned with creating an effective way to deal with the “vastly superior massed 
ground forces that our battle units must oppose in the future.”63  Using his Korean War 
experience against the CPVF, Almond wrote:  
I am confident that the combination of conventional artillery, including anti-
aircraft, the tank, combat aircraft, guided missile and rocket, the defensive 
mine and surface controlled searchlights constitute the means, together with 
radio and radar communications equipment, by which this support of the 




In a separate memorandum to the students of the U.S. Army War College Almond asked for 
constructive comments on his concepts.  The first paragraph argued that, “Success in ground 
battle not only envisages well trained infantry but the highest type of integrated fire support 
for the infantry, produced in the most effective manner.”  Almond used the term artillery in 
the broadest sense, defined as “explosive and casualty effecting projectiles delivered in 
adequate amounts to have the desired destructive effects on the enemy.”65   
        During the Battle of the Soyang River, Almond did not have the traditional amount of 
artillery support and stated that the twenty artillery battalions in the X Corps were “meager 
by WWII European standards.”66  This was a similar complaint Ridgway and Van Fleet made 
about the artillery available to the Eighth Army.  Van Fleet was of the opinion that in the 
summer of 1951, he was short by seventy plus battalions of artillery.
67
  In concert with Van 
Fleet, Almond viewed part of the solution as an increase in the number of rounds fired per 
artillery tube.  During the Battle of the Soyang River, the 38
th
 Field Artillery Battalion, a 
105mm towed howitzer unit, fired 11,891 rounds in a twenty-four hour period (night of 18-19 
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May 1951), a record.  This record was beaten later in the year during the Battle for Bloody 
Ridge (August 1951).  At Bloody Ridge, the 15
th
 Field Artillery Battalion fired 14,200 
105mm rounds in a twenty-four hour period.
68
  Capacity to fire innumerable artillery rounds 
supplanted the need to increase the number of artillery tubes and artillery battalions stationed 
in Korea. 
        The point was not only the volume of fire but also the way fire support was used.  The 
“box barrage” or what became known as “box me in” fire was used to great effect during the 
Battle of Soyang River.  “Box me in” fire became the standard operating procedure 
throughout the Eighth Army.  In Almond’s presentation he also mentioned the use of VT or 
proximity fuse artillery fired on top of friendly positions.
 69
  The “box barrage” tactic that 
Almond advocated constituted the majority of the shells that the 38
th
 Field Artillery Battalion 
fired during that engagement.  2,000 105mm VT rounds were dropped on Company K, of the 
38
th
 Infantry Regiment in the first eight minutes.
 70
  This barrage was designed to destroy the 
attacking CPVF forces that broke through K Company’s wire.  These fires continued for the 
next four hours as the company commander and his FO shifted fires in front of and on 
different parts of their own position.  Almond did not shelter the audience with respect to the 
risks being taken in Korea.  By 1954 when the Army published Combat Actions in Korea, 
calling in VT fire on your own fortified position become the norm if attacked by 
overwhelming numbers, and it used K Company as an example.
71
  This adjustment 
demonstrated the dramatic shift that occurred in the practical use of fire support. 
        Almond stated that his presentation “will not deal with a most important method of fire 
support to the infantry – that of close tactical air support – except for the radar controlled 
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airplane bomber.”72  During the time of this presentation and soon after it was given, Van 
Fleet challenged the USAF over CAS and forced some changes but never to his staisfaction.
73
  
The Air Force gave CAS the lowest priority among all air missions. 
74
  Both U.S. Army and 
Marine Corps commanders were frustrated by the way the U.S. Air Force employed its assets 
and Van Fleet voiced their dissatisfaction with a formal complaint in December 1951.
75
  In 
another direct attack on U.S. Air Force doctrine, Almond charged: 
The present air doctrine prescribes that interdiction is most effective against 
transportation facilities such as railroads, vehicles and marshaling yards.  It is 
realized that this is a very important aspect of war but, as demonstrated in 
Korea, is believed that close support bombing is equally and sometimes of 
greater importance. Once the enemy has concentrated his forces near the front, 
then is a most appropriate time to shift the preponderance of bombing effort to 
close support missions… Highly effective interdiction and neutralization can 
better be accomplished by bombing the enemy when he concentrates near the 




        This was heresy to the U.S. Air Force. That Almond advocated the use of bombers, to 
include B-29s, in support of ground forces under the control of Army MPQ-2 radar system 
operators, was unacceptable to the Air Force.  But by May 1951, the situation was so grave, 
with Almond’s artillery tubes burning up shooting more rounds than they were supposed to, 
that the Fifth Air Force finally allocated B-29 and B-26 bombers to support ground forces.  
Using 500 lbs. bombs armed with a VT fuse, these bomber aircraft conducted night bombing 
raids on troop concentrations in front of X Corps positions, under the direction of X Corps 
radar operators.  The largest bombing run occurred on the night of 22-23 May, when 22 B-
29s bombed CPVF concentrations preparing to conduct a night attack.  Almond confirmed 
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that the proven accuracy of the MPQ-2 radar allowed the use of bombers on targets as close 
as 500 yards from friendly positions.
77
  
        Almond also encouraged the development of new forms of rocket and missile artillery.  
These new rockets and missiles would augment traditional tube artillery, CAS, and other 
direct fire weapon systems. Almond also stressed speed, mobility and flexibility in the 
employment of fire support platforms, as well as the creation of integrated fire plans at all 
levels.  In his conclusion he stressed that “the complete integration of all types of supporting 
fires is essential to the success of the ground battle.”78  Almond’s fire support concepts were 
used with great effect to halt the CPVF’s Second Phase Fifth Offensive, and set an example 
for what was possible in terms of coordinated fire support. 
        The image of Eighth Army artillery firing enumerable shells in support of outposts is 
generally true despite some shortages and restrictions in 1952.  Eighth Army dominated the 
artillery duel until the winter of 1952-1953, when the number of Communist tubes surpassed 
the number of U.N. tubes.
79
  The only U.N. increase in tubes from 1952 to 1953 was the 
creation of additional ROKA artillery battalions, added to ROKA divisions.  From the start of 
the war, each ROKA division possessed one 105mm towed artillery battalion.  Through the 
efforts of Van Fleet, Ridgway and Clark, the U.S. Army supplied and trained the ROKA with 
two additional 105mm battalions and one 155mm battalion, bringing them to four artillery 
battalions in each division, three 105mm battalions and one 155mm battalion.
80
   
        Even with this increase, the number of U.N. artillery tubes did not keep up with the 
increase in communist artillery tubes.
81
  But what Eighth Army forces lacked in tubes they 
made up for in quantity and quality of rounds fired from each tube.  Eighth Army forces also 
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shifted their artillery pieces to maximize support to units in contact.  Evidence of this was 
demonstrated during the Communist third phase of their “Final Offensive,” which started in 
July 1953 and ended with the initiation of the armistice at 2200 hours, 27 July.  The 
communists fired 705,000 rounds of artillery in support of numerous assaults on Eighth Army 
outposts and the ROKA sector of the MLR.  This was a massive number of rounds fired 
along the 155 mile long front in support of the twenty plus division offensive.  But in contrast 
the Eighth Army fired a staggering 4,711,120 artillery rounds to stop this last communist 
offensive and hold the MLR.
82
  
        Almond’s fire support concepts were applied during the many raids and platoon 
defenses conducted by Eighth Army forces during the last seven months of the war.  For 
example, the 5
th
 Marine Regiment raided Hill 15 “Detroit” on the 25 February 1953 with Fox 
Company minus.  This was an excellent example of a small infantry unit operation.  The raid 
took 68 minutes and employed two infantry platoons.  The total time of the raid included 
movement to the objective, actions on the objective, and completion of the planned 
withdrawal.  To accomplish this minor raid with less than a company of infantry, the 5
th
 
Marines’ employed artillery, tanks, and CAS systems.  Preparatory fires, isolation fires 
during the assault, and covering fires during the planned withdrawal immersed the two 
assaulting platoons during the raid.  The varied fire support during this operation included 
11,881 round of artillery fired by the 11
th
 Marines (FA) and 1
st
 Royal Canadian Horse 
Artillery.  These units fired a combination of 105mm, 155mm, and 25lbs guns.
83
  CAS strikes 
from Marine Corsairs dropped 500lbs bombs, napalm canister, rockets, and conducted gun 
runs on communist positions.  Direct fire weapons included the heavy weapons company 
which fired 200+ 75mm recoilless rifle rounds on and around the target area.  More than 700 
90mm tank rounds were fired on target in support of the raid, and all heavy machine gunners 
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 Marine section of the MLR, engaged targets in support of the raid.
84
  This was 
one of several small raids regularly conducted up and down the MLR by various Eighth 
Army units during this period of trench warfare.  This use of fire support was not just for 
raids against communist positions.  It was also part of the defensive system that Eighth Army 
forces employed to hold the MLR and the outposts in no-man’s land.   
        The first of three stages of the “Chinese Final Offensive 1953” occurred from 13-26 













Armies & the 33
rd
 Division).  These forces needed to learn how to chew Eighth Army “sticky 
candy.”  Their goals were to capture fortified Eighth Army outposts.  From these positions, 
the CPVF planned to conduct their major push in late June and early July.  The communist 
military headquarters chose fifty-six Eighth Army positions to attack.  These targets ranged 
from platoon to battalion size outposts in front of the MLR.
85
  This represented the highest 
development of the “eating sticky candy” operational concept that Mao directed Peng to 
adopt in summer 1951.  Each of the fifty-six outposts was a piece of Eighth Army “sticky 
candy” the CPVF intended to chew up.  
        The actions in and around squad OP (Outpost) Snook on the night of 15-16 May 1953 
demonstrated that the precision fire support concept applied and was effectively employed at 
the smallest level.  It was no longer a battalion and higher function but the smallest unit in the 
U.S. Army, the squad, which could call down hell on an attacking CPVF unit.
86
  A squad size 
element from Third Platoon, Able Company, of the 17
th
 Infantry Regiment, led by Sergeant 
George Transeau, manned OP Snook during the night of 15-16 May.  The CPVF attacked OP 
Snook with 40 to 50 soldiers at 2304 hours.  Members of the squad fought in close combat 
with the CPVF.  Through the use of wire communication, Transeau initiated the fire support 
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plan for his position.  From 2304 through 2400 hours, fire support units consisting of two 
Quad-50s, a platoon of 4.2in mortars, four 60mm mortars, and a battery of 105mm howitzers 
fired in support of the squad outpost.  As the CPVF forces pulled back, flares assisted 
Transeau in continuing to call in fire on withdrawing CPVF.
87
  This was a small contact 
between a CPVF platoon size unit and a U.S. Army squad.  Despite the small number of U.S. 
Army forces engaged, higher command, supported its squad leader and swiftly employed all 
available fire support in and around the outpost.   
        In support of the need for additional fire support training, in 1954, the Infantry School 
determined that, on average, units were not employing fire support enough and “greatly 
increased the emphasis on fire support planning.”88  The same Infantry School study 
referenced the observations made by Almond’s X Corps studies.  These observations were 
made during Almond’s time in command of X Corps, October 1950 through July 1951.89  
These actions demonstrated the U.S. Army’s adoption of the tactical concept of synchronized 
fire support systems to protect U.S. Army positions, no matter how small.   
        Eighth Army forces faced several challenges during the trench warfare period of the 
Korean War.  In terms of combat forces they were greatly outnumbered along the MLR.  The 















 ID and 45
th
 ID) and one 
Commonwealth Division for a total of twenty-seven divisions.
90
  The 24
th
 Infantry Division 
was brought back to Korea from Japan starting on 3 July 1953 to bolster security in rear 
areas.
91
  Normally two to three U.S. divisions and four to six ROKA divisions were kept off 
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the line for training or on other missions, such as securing POWs.  At the time of the cease-
fire, July 1953, there were eighteen U.N. divisions holding the MLR.
92
  In contrast, the 
communist forces positioned approximately twenty-eight divisions along the MLR.  This 
force consisted of six to seven KPA divisions and twenty-one to twenty-two CPVF divisions.  
Total communist forces included approximately nineteen KPA divisions and numerous 
separate brigades plus fifty-seven CPVF divisions, along with numerous support elements 
echeloned in-depth.
93
  The lopsided manpower advantage and willingness to spend lives on 
the part of the CPVF was highlighted by the last communist offensive from May to July 
1953.  During this offensive they poured over twenty divisions into the U.N. line, the 
majority into an area initially held by less than five ROKA divisions.
94
 
        Operational initiative was ceded to the communists once Ridgway directed his forces 
conduct an “active defense;” the JCS affirmed that decision in JCS Message 86804.  This 
message stated the acceptability of the current frontline trace as a possible demarcation line 
between the two Koreas.
95
  The willingness to sacrifice lives to achieve military objectives 
gave communist commanders an added advantage.  One of the ways Eighth Army 
commanders adapted to this challenge was in the use of fire support systems.  Through the 
incorporation of every available weapons system into their fire support plans, and their 
willingness to expend innumerable rounds to save men, the U.N. command sacrificed steel 
instead of men.  Van Fleet’s guidance made this clear, “We must expend steel and fire, not 
men.”96  The U.S. Army learned through these engagements, changed its T/O&E, and 
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improved its doctrine during and after the Korean War.  This resulted in a force with 




Development of Special Operations during the Korean War 
               The development of special operations forces during the Korean War created for the 
first time standardized U.S. Army Special Operations units.  Special operations were tainted 
after WWII by the image of the OSS and its leader Brigadier General William “Wild Bill” 
Donovan.  On Truman’s order, in September of 1945 the OSS was shut down and replaced 
several months later by the temporary Central Intelligence Group (CIG).
98
  The CIG was a 
bureaucratic orphan without a strong leader or defined place in the U.S. government 
hierarchy.  Even though the War Department received the authority to conduct covert 
operations after the OSS was eliminated, it gave this up by default to the temporary CIG and 
its successor organization the CIA, because the U.S. Army did not possess the desire or 
specific TO&E units designed to conduct these missions.   
        Creating permanent Special Operations units and fighting the Korean War were closely 
linked.  Like many other parts of the NSC 68 expansion of the DoD, the creation of a 
permanent Special Operations capability had its genesis in WWII.  At the beginning of the 
Korean War, U.S. Army leaders discovered a need for Special Operations capabilities 
(psychological warfare, special reconnaissance, unconventional warfare, and special support 
capabilities) that they possessed during WWII.
99
  MacArthur requested trained units with 
both artillery and special capabilities that the U.S. Army no longer possessed.
100
  Trained 
special operations personnel in the fields of partisan/unconventional and psychological 
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warfare were two of the areas in which Far East Command (FEC) and Eighth Army were 
lacking.
101
  Recognition of this operational requirement brought together a unique group of 
individuals who created the institutions now known as the U.S. Army J.F.K. Special Warfare 
Center, U.S. Army Special Forces Command and the 4
th




        The men responsible creating what became the U.S. Army Special Operations 
Command were brought together under the Army Office of the Chief of Psychological 
Warfare (OCPW).  The four men with the most influence in the creation of a standing U.S. 
Army Special Operations capability were Brigadier General Robert McClure, Lieutenant 
Colonel Russell Volckmann, Colonel Wendell Fertig and Colonel Aaron Bank.
103
  The 
creation of the OCPW as a separate office that reported directly to the Army Chief of Staff 
occurred in January 1951, carved out of a place within the U.S. Army Staff for Special 
Operations.  OCPW established the Psychological Warfare Center at Fort Bragg in May 
1952.  The Psychological Warfare Center created the institution that would train all U.S. 
Army Special Operations forces.  It produced the 10
th
 Special Forces Group (deployed 
immediately to Bad Tolz, Germany) the 77
th
 Special Forces Group (based at Ft. Bragg for 
worldwide deployment) and additional Psychological Warfare units in November 1953.  This 
created permanent U.S. Army Special Operations units for the first time in Army history.  
During the Korean War, the U.S. Army authorized Special Operations units while the U.N. 
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Command created parallel provisional special operations capability, in Korea, supported by 
operators trained at Ft. Bragg.
104
  
        The men involved with the founding U.S. Army Special Operations were familiar with 
Asia and Korea when they went about their task to create the Psychological Warfare Center 
and Special Forces.  OCPW received full reports on all partisan operations ongoing in 
Korea.
105
  Though McClure served in the ETO during WWII, he spent most of his early years 
in the U.S. Army assigned to units in the Philippines and China.  He was the senior of seven 
trained Psychological Operations officers in the U.S. Army when the Korean War began.  
McClure was instrumental in the development and employment of psychological operations 
units during the Korean War.
106
  While he shepherded the creation of the Psychological 
Warfare Center (a military school for both Psychological Warfare and Special Forces that 
became the Special Warfare Center in 1955), the creation of permanent psychological 
operations units and Special Forces units, he also supported and advised the psychological 
warfare effort in Korea.
107
         
        Lieutenant Colonel (later Brigadier General) Russell Volckmann was one of McClure’s 
first additions to the Special Operations sub-directorate of OCPW.  During the first six 
months of the Korean War, Volckmann served as the executive officer for the Special 
Activities Group – Far East Command (SEP-FEC).108  This unit was the initial FEC attempt 
to create a partisan unit and conduct partisan operations in the DPRK.  SEP-FEC would later 
become Combined Command Reconnaissance Activities Korea or CCRAK, which would 
supervise United Nations Partisan Forces Korea (UNPFK), which later changed into the 
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United Nations Partisan Infantry Korea (UNPIK), all working in a convoluted manner for 
both FEC and Eighth Army.
109
  These provisional units were responsible for conducting 
special operations throughout the Korean Theater of Operations (KTO).   
        While recovering from an injury at Walter Reed Hospital, Volckmann was propositioned 
to join OCPW’s Special Operations (SO) office by McClure; Volckmann was then 
transferred to the newly created OCPW SO.
110
  Volckmann’s previous special operations 
experience began during the fall of Bataan in 1942.  He spent all of WWII in the Philippines 
on the northern island of Luzon, building a 22,000 man Philippine insurgent force to fight 
against the Imperial Japanese Army.
111
  After WWII, Volckmann helped write the U.S. 
Army’s first field manuals on Operations against Guerrilla Forces and Guerrilla Warfare (FM 
31-20 & 31-21).
112
  These were written in 1949 but not published until February and October 
1951 respectively.  These were the first manuals in the special operations category that dealt 
with what was then known as partisan operations, now called unconventional warfare.
113
  
Because of his work with SEP-FEC, he was familiar with the strengths and weaknesses of 
that organization. 
        Colonel Fertig, like Volckmann, fought in WWII as a guerrilla leader in the Philippines 
but on the southern island of Mindanao.  As a supportive senior officer he served in several 
senior positions within OCPW and as the first deputy at the Psychological Warfare Center.
114
  
The most well known member of OCPW was Colonel Aaron Bank. He served in the OSS 
during WWII, in both Europe and Indo-China.  He was fighting in Korea as an operations 
officer in the 187
rd
 Regimental Combat Team (Airborne), when he was reassigned in 
February 1951 to OCPW as the head of the Special Operations sub-directorate.  There he 
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joined Volckmann and others to fight a bureaucratic campaign within the Pentagon to create a 
standing special operations capability within the U.S. Army.
115
  
        Before the Korean War, the U.S. Army experimented with the idea of special operations 
in a variety of ways.  As early as FM 100-5 Operations (1939), the U.S. Army understood 
that guerrilla warfare and combating guerrilla warfare were operations it might conduct.
116
  In 
each subsequent addition of FM 100-5 Operations the Army grappled with the idea of special 
operations, but it remained poorly defined.  Each update of the manual, the only document in 
U.S. Army doctrine that dealt with special operations, increased the scope of special 
operations, to thirteen different types by the 1954 version.
117
  The different types of special 
operations included Combat in Fortified Areas, Combat in Towns, Operations at River Lines, 
Night Operations, Combat in Woods, Combat at a Defile, Jungle Operations, Desert 
Operations, Mountain Operations, Operations in Deep Snow and Extreme Cold, Airborne and 
Amphibious Operations.
118
   
        Guerrilla Warfare was the only Special Operation type not defined by its physical 
characteristics.  Each of the FM 100-5 Operations manuals retained the duality of guerrilla 
warfare and combating guerrilla warfare as two parts of the same operational concept.  In 
these manuals, the U.S. Army defined the perspective of the guerrilla/partisan and the forces 
that would conduct counter guerrilla/partisan warfare.  For the first time in FM 100-5 
Operations (1954), because of the publication of FM 31-21Organization and Conduct of 
Guerrilla Warfare, a supporting manual was referenced and the description of guerrilla 
warfare shortened.
119
  The 1954 edition did this for each of the thirteen types of Special 
Operations.  FM 100-5 Operations (1954) was the last operations manual to list fighting in 
                                                          
115
 Bank, From OSS to Green Berets, 154-183. 
116
 Department of the Army, FM 100-5 Operations (1939), V-VI,  228-231. 
117
 Ibid, V-VI & 228-231; Department of the Army, FM 100-5 Operations (1941), III-V,  238-240; 
Department of the Army, FM 100-5 Operations (1944), V-IX , 284-286; Department of the Army, FM 100-5 
Operations (1949), III-IV,  231-33; Department of the Army, FM 100-5 Operations (1954), 1-3,  171-173. 
118
 Department of the Army, FM 100-5 Operations (1954), 150-169, 173-196.  
119
 Ibid., 173, paragraph 379. 
100 
 
different terrain or conditions as special operations.
120
  In subsequent manuals 
guerrilla/partisan warfare became a stand - alone chapter named unconventional warfare.
121
  
With the creation of the Psychological Warfare Center, the U.S. Army shifted the 
responsibility for Psychological Warfare and Special Forces doctrinal development to the 
Psychological Warfare Center, now the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center 
and School at Fort Bragg.   
        As with the other operational concepts examined in this study, the Korean War and the 
urgency it created facilitated experimentation with and institutionalization of special 
operations concepts developed during WWII.  McClure, in a memorandum to General Collins 
in August 1951, expressed his concern that opportunities in Korea to experiment with 
different techniques and equipment, such as helicopters to spread psychological messages 
were missed.
122
  The OCPW Chief and his staff viewed Korea as an opportunity to test 
special operations concepts.   
        Through OCPW’s urging, fifty-five newly trained Special Forces officers and nine 
enlisted Special Forces NCOs were requested by FEC and sent to Korea in the spring of 
1953.
123
  This initial deployment created a situation of too few Special Forces troops, not 
trained for operations in Korea, arriving too late in the war to apply their skills.  By spring 
1953, when the Special Forces troops arrived, CCRAK was focused on shutting down 
UNPIK units, not expanding them.
124
  From May to July of 1953, UNPIK was required by 
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Eighth Army to recover and demobilize over 22,000 Korean guerrillas in North Korea.
125
  By 
the time of the armistice, the U.S. Army had created an institutional special operations 




 Special Forces Groups 
provided the U.S. Army a special operations institution along with T/O&E units capable of 
conducting special operations. 
        The Korean War partisan warfare effort became a tool used to protect the fledgling 
Psychological Warfare Center and its Psychological and Special Forces units.  As the 
armistice was signed, the U.S. Army funded and directed the Operations Research Office 
(ORO) to conduct a study of the U.N. partisan effort.  The report were finished in November 
1955 and released for publication as a secret U.S. Army document in June 1956.  The study 
concluded that “the decision to employ Korean partisans in guerrilla warfare role… were 
sound.”  The report found deficiencies in the training of the officers chosen to lead the 
partisan teams; it also found command errors in the employment of these forces by Eighth 
Army and FEC.
126
   
        Many of these errors were attributed to the lack of trained guerrilla advisors, limited 
knowledge of guerrilla doctrine at all levels, and the failure to clearly determine the goals 
Eighth Army and FEC wanted the guerrillas to accomplish.
127
  The report recommended three 
things that could support success in future limited wars.  First, it recommended that all U.S. 
Army officers and specifically field grade officers should receive training in guerrilla warfare 
and its proper application.  Second, the study recommended doctrinal changes to FM 31-21 
that included considerations for conducting guerrilla warfare in a limited war environment.  
Third, it recommended that Special Forces personnel should receive greater amounts of 
training in language, habits, culture and customs.  It also recommended that one method to 
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enhance this training would include assigning Special Forces personnel to MAAGs as trainers 
of foreign units.
128
  This report helped validate the need for a permanent special warfare 
center and the three under strength Special Forces Groups.  The advice on guerrilla warfare in 
a limited war environment was incorporated into the 1958 edition of FM 31-21 Guerrilla 
Warfare and Special Forces Operations.
129
  
        One of the major benefits of the Korean War with regard to Special Operations 
concerned the number of regular Army officers exposed to partisan warfare.  The next two 
Army Chiefs of Staff, Ridgway and Taylor, were heavily exposed to the challenges of 
commanding a joint, combined partisan force in a limited war environment.  Ridgway 
mentioned the partisan operations in his book The Korean War.
130
  Clark, who took over for 
Ridgway as U.N. Commander, devoted an entire chapter in his book praising psychological 
and partisan warfare in the Korean War.  Clark laid out the CPVF/KPA psychological 
warfare techniques and used his writing to help discredit some of their techniques, while 
praising the work done by U.S. Army Psychological Warfare units.  In dealing with guerrilla 
operations, he also bragged about the ability of CCRAK’s evasion and escape network that 
recovered downed pilots.  Clark supported the retention of special operations capabilities:   
Full details of our guerrilla war against the Communists in North Korea must 
remain secret, for in North Korea many of the partisan tactics that will have to 
be used in any future war with the Communists were developed and refined.  
Partisan warfare, important in the war against the Axis powers, probably will 
be even more important in any future war with the Communists because the 
Reds have demonstrated an ability to harness whole populations to their war 
effort.  The free world will have to combat this by developing guerrilla 
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Taylor’s actions as Army Chief of Operations (G-3), Eighth Army Commander, Army Chief 
of Staff and Chairman of the JCS demonstrated his support for Special Forces.  He was the 
Army G-3 that signed off on the creation of the Psychological Operations Center, 10
th
 Special 
Forces Group TO&E and their facilities at Fort Bragg.
132
  While he served as Eighth Army 
commander, Special Forces troops arrived in the KTO.
133
  As the Army Chief of Staff he 
approved the expansion of an additional Special Forces Group based in Asia, the 1
st
 Special 
Forces Group based in Okinawa.
134
  And while serving as Chairman of the JCS he oversaw 
President Kennedy’s planned expansion of Special Forces in 1963.135 
        In 1952 the Army changed the way it prepared for and fought wars.  No longer would it 
raise special units in an emergency and just as quickly disbanded when the threat passed.  
The protracted struggle against communism and the crisis caused by the Korean War created 
an environment hospitable to the institutionalization of special operations in the U.S. Army.   
Taking advantage of the Korean situation, with support from Secretary of the Army Pace, a 
group of highly capable special warfare advocates created an institutional and operational 
capability that was combat tested in Korea.   
        The U.S. Army could now use its special operations units to fight against communism 
globally.  The U.S. Army spent over twenty years prior to 1952 pondering partisan/guerrilla 
warfare, and occasionally experimented with different possible organizations to execute the 
operational concept.  UNPIK was the last experiment before the U.S. Army settled on 
Volckmann and Bank’s Special Forces concept.  No longer could the Army wait for a special 
unit to train up for a special mission after a crisis began.  It needed a partisan/guerrilla and 
psychological warfare forces ready to conduct missions before a crisis developed.  The 
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Korean War demonstrated the special operations forces truths: Special Operations Forces 
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Chapter 5: Korean War Trench warfare: Coalition Operations and Republic of Korea 
Armed Forces 
 
With the U.S. Army, through Far East Command and Eighth Army, taking the military lead 
in fighting the Korean War, the Army had to devise operational concepts to allow for the 
employment of coalition partner forces and the Republic of Korea Army (ROKA).  While the 
refining of internal changes to how the U.S. Army would fight an attritional defensive war 
was important, so was the development of operational concepts on how the U.S. Army would 
lead coalition operations and the ROKA.  Eighth Army, through Van Fleet’s leadership, 
decided to integrate most coalition units into the U.S. Army command and logistical system 
as fourth battalions/regiments attached to U.S. Army units, normally divisions, and supported 
the creation of the 1
st
 Commonwealth Division for Commonwealth units.
1
  With a shortage of 
manpower and the desire to have the Koreans take the lead, it was necessary to build the 
capability and capacity of the ROKA to stand as equals on the MLR.  To accomplish this 
force generation mission, Van Fleet increased the number of advisors that would coach, 
teach, and mentor the ROK Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps.
2
   
 
Leading Coalition Operations 
        The U.S. Army fought the Korean War as the leader of a U.N. Command (UNC).  The 
ROK and twenty-one other nations served under the U.N. Command that prosecuted the 
Korean War.  With the establishment of the U.N. Command, led by a U.S. Army general, the 
concept of coalition warfare changed. Instead of segregating each nation’s unit to a different 
section of the MLR, the U.S. Army integrated the units of different nations into one army, the 
Eighth Army.   
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        In 1950, the U.N. actualized the concept of collective security through the authorization 
of an army to fight a war to defend the ROK.  The Eighth Army that took the field in Korea 
was supported by the world’s most powerful state and by four of the five UNSC members.  
Though six years prior, the U.S. led the successful invasion and subsequent liberation of 
Europe, and General Dwight D. Eisenhower served as the Supreme Allied Commander, the 
U.S. Army did not possess a doctrine to execute coalition warfare.
3
   
        The proposition that the U.S. Army would lead, much less dominate, an international 
coalition, despite its WWII experience, was not a concept the leadership of the U.S. Army or 
government wanted to entertain.
4
  With the U.S. atomic monopoly and the world still 
devastated by WWII the U.S. Army and Navy were cut down to levels near those of the 
1930s.  There was an understanding among high ranking officers, based on their WWII 
experience, that it was best to give allies their own battle space adjacent to U.S. formations.   
        These allied units would operate under their own command, using their own concepts 
and supported by their own logistics systems.  Therefore when the call went out to send 
forces to rally under the U.N. flag and defend the ROK, the U.S. Army was not prepared to 
integrate and employ such forces.
5
  Almost sixty years after the Korean War, the U.S. Army 
still does not have a doctrine for coalition warfare.
6
  Despite another decade of coalition 
warfare in Iraq and Afghanistan the DoD still struggles with how to fight as the leader of a 
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coalition.  Doctrinal harmonization within NATO comes closest and serves as the model for a 
Multi-National Combined Forces Commands.
7
  
        Despite the lack of doctrine, the U.S. Army led a combined force that included the ROK 
and contingents from twenty other nations through three years of war.
8
  Four of these only 
sent medical personnel and were considered neutral; the majority of their medical assistance 
went to wounded U.N. soldiers and ROK civilians.
9
  At first, these U.N. forces were 
employed in an ad hoc fashion. They were attached and detached from Eighth Army units 
based on need and the fluid situation.
10
  Through 1951 and 1952, Ridgway and Van Fleet 
worked with the leaders of each national contingent to create a system that employed, 
supported and rotated each U.N. contingent.
11
   
        The largest participating force, besides the U.S. Army and the ROKA, was the 
Commonwealth Force that included ground, air and/or naval units from the U.K., Canada, 
Australia, India, and New Zealand.  South Africa, also a Commonwealth member, 




  Because 
Commonwealth forces used similar doctrine, equipment, common language and culture, it 







  This was not a simple endeavor but it did create a 
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multi-national division inside a larger multi-national army.  The creation of the 1
st
 BCD 
allowed the members of the Commonwealth to handle many of their Commonwealth issues 
internally and present a united front when working with the U.S. Army dominated U.N. 
command.
14
  Despite this force using many of its own weapons, it still depended on the U.S. 
Army for much of its basic logistical support. 
        The 1
st
 BCD consisted of U.K., Canadian and Australian infantry and support 
formations.  New Zealand provided an artillery regiment approximately the size of a U.S. 
Army artillery battalion.
15
  To round out the force, an Indian medical unit was incorporated to 
support the medical needs of the division.
16
  The other U.N. units, mostly battalion size, were 
permanently attached to specific U.S. Army regiments as fourth battalions.
17
  The exception 
was the Turkish Brigade, which served as the 25
th
 Infantry Divisions’ fourth regiment from 3 
August 1951 through 27 July 1953.
18
   
        Dealing with the contributors to the U.N. Command was a U.S. Army responsibility.  
The 1
st
 Marine Division remained separate except for added responsibility it assumed for the 
1
st
 ROK Marine Regiment.
19
  The only reason U.N. units were detached from their parent 
U.S. Army division after the fall of 1951 was when those divisions (1
st
 Cavalry & 24
th
 
Infantry Divisions) in December 1951 & January 1952 respectively were rotated to Japan and 
replaced by two National Guard divisions.
20
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        U.N. forces supplied to the U.N. Command were mostly volunteers and professional 
soldiers.
21
  This differed greatly from the ROKA and U.S. Army soldiers, who were mostly 
conscripted into service.
22
  These professionals also differed from their opponents, the 
CPVF/KPA, who were also conscripted into service.
23
  The one exception was the U.K. 
contingent; it was a mix of professionals and national service men.   
        The French Battalion consisted of volunteers and was one of the best units to go through 
the U.N. Reception Center.  This battalion consisted of three volunteer companies 
representing the three ground services of the French Army:  the Troupes de Marine (colonial 
army), metropolitan troops from France proper, and parachutists/legionnaires.
24
  In similar 
fashion the Dutch, Belgium, and Luxembourg elements were volunteers, most with WWII 
and colonial experience.  Many of the Dutch soldiers came from the failed Dutch attempt to 
regain control of Indonesia.
25
   No matter which country they came from, the troops and 
officers of the European contingents were generally of the highest quality and willing to 
fight.   
        As Allan Millett stresses in his book The War for Korea, 1950-1951: They Came from 
the North, reasons for sending forces to fight in Korea, beside the Americans and Koreans, 
were complicated.  Official reasons for involvement of each contingent stressed a desire to 
resist communism, uphold the principles of the U.N., and assist a fellow nation under 
attack.
26
   Besides these stated reasons lay other complicated national interests.  Each country 
needed or wished to exert influence on their relationship with the U.S. and ensure continued 
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  The European contributors wanted to ensure such support for the 
newly created NATO Alliance.  The Asian contributors (Thailand, Philippines, Australia and 
New Zealand) wanted to ensure that the U.S. did not abandon them and their ongoing fights 
against communism.  During the Korean War, Thailand and the Philippines both fought local 
Communists or separatists and worked to recover from WWII.  Despite different motives, all 
these nations placed their armed forces under the direct control of the U.S. Army through the 
U.N. Command and Eighth Army.
28
 
        The U.N. imprint of legitimacy given to the Korean War supported the coalition’s 
actions.  From the U.S. perspective the U.N. authorization for the military endeavor and 
broad military support from other nations solidified their leadership of the global 
community.
29
  What the U.N. resolutions did not do was meld these U.N. units into a 
coherent fighting force.  To forge this U.N. force was the responsibility of the Eighth Army.
30
  
Without direction from Washington or their own capitals, the commanders on the ground 
adapted and improvised to create a formidable unified force.  
        The U.S. Army adjusted to the challenge, by creating internal systems to deal with 
integration issues that arose with U.N. Forces.
31
  Eighth Army made allowances for each 
U.N. unit’s quirks.  It solved the logistical problem and integrated the U.N. contingents into 
Eighth Army’s logistical system.32  The costs to support the U.N. contingents were tabulated 
throughout the Korean War as a running debt and then negotiated by the U.S. State 
Department after the armistice.
33
  While the different U.N. contingents fought, Uncle Sam 
would foot the bill.  Except for select units, mainly the 1
st
 BCD, the U.S. Army supplied all 
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the equipment U.N. elements used, with minor exceptions.
34
  Language problems were a 
constant irritant throughout the conflict.  English was the official language of the U.N. 
Command but the U.S. Army was required to field translators and advisors to each U.N. unit, 
to ensure proper communication of orders and commanders intent.
35
  Besides the French and 
Turks most of the NATO units possessed enough English speakers.
36
  The non-European 
units were mixed in their performance and required a greater number of advisors, translators, 
and command supervision.
37
   
        Each U.N. unit arrived in Korea at a different level of readiness.  To solve the training 
problems encountered during the arrival and reception of U.N. units Eighth Army established 
the U.N. Reception Center at Taegu.  It was a centralized facility designed to prepare the 
various contingents to fight in Korea and work with the Eighth Army and its systems.
38
  With 
respect to the doctrinal issues, the various U.N. units were allowed to use their own doctrine 




        From the U.S. Army perspective there was only one major problem the U.S. had with 
the other U.N. contingents.  Clark wrote, “We just never had enough of them.”40  When 
necessary, the U.S. provided liaison teams to assist with fire support and coordination of 
additional support units.
41
  The tragic stand of the 1
st
 Battalion, The Gloucestershire 
Regiment on Hill 235, on 25 April 1951, during the CPVF Fifth Offensive First Phase, and 
the failure of the rescue mission helped standardize Eighth Army operations.  The destruction 
of a British battalion and the failed rescue changed U.S. Army policy toward its U.N. 
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  Ridgway made it clear to all Eighth Army commanders that the destruction of 
a U.N. unit was unacceptable.
43
  Farrar-Hockley quotes Van Fleet telling Almond on the 10
th
 
of May, “Give when you are pressed hard. I don’t want units cut off and I want you to handle 
UN units very carefully to avoid their being cut off.”44  Farrar-Hockley assess that The 
Glosters were lost due to poor judgment on the part of the American Division Commander, 
General Soule.  As the war continued into its second year, the issue of rotation was raised by 
U.N. units.  After consultation with the U.N. contingent commanders and their home 
ministries it was decided by Van Fleet that they would rotate as complete units and not as 
individuals.
45
  Respect between U.N. and U.S. units grew, as they became permanent fixtures 
within U.S. regiments after the summer of 1951.
46
 
        Despite the valor of the various U.N. units and the cohesion built over two years of close 
relationships between U.S. and U.N. units, institutionally the U.S. Army did not change 
despite its new role as presumptive leader and organizer of future U.N. or Coalition missions.  
Clark wrote in his 1954 book, From the Danube to the Yalu, about his experience as the U.N. 
Commander.  He stated bluntly the need for greater standardization among the allies who 
“are going to have to join forces to fight the common fight against aggressors in the future.”47  
Instead the Eighth and Seventh Armies came up with informal ways to conduct combined 
operations that never reached the level of doctrine. 
        From the political perspective, the U.N. force that fought the Korean War was a success.  
As Winston Churchill noted to Clark; “The armistice marks the first victory of collective 
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resistance over aggression.”48  At the strategic level, the creation of permanent military 
coalitions was an essential part to the Containment strategy.  This goal transcended the 
Truman and Eisenhower administrations.  Military coalitions were viewed as a successful and 
relatively cheap diplomatic tactic, which supported the execution of the Containment 
strategy.   
        In 1949 the Truman administration helped create NATO.  In the Pacific, soon after Clark 
called for a Pacific Treaty Organization or PATO, the U.S. and its Asian allies created the 
Southeast Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO) on 8 September 1954 in Manila.  The 
building of mutual defense treaty organizations hit its height in the 1950’s with the creation 
of CENTO, the Central Treaty Organization, in Baghdad on 24 February 1955.
49
  Even after 
the creation of NATO, SEATO, and CENTO, the U.S. Army did not change how it organized 
its tactical formations, doctrine or trained its officers to better integrate allied units or lead a 
coalition.
50
 As an operational concept, leading coalitions was something the U.S. Army 
would do but not plan for. 
        In terms of changes in operational concepts wrought by the war in Korea, the most 
decisive was the creation of NATO and the Seventh Army, half a world away.  The NATO 
military alliance created a combined military headquarters and organized regular exercises 
that employed NATO units under its command.
51
  After 60 years NATO still lacks a coherent 
doctrine.  Despite this flaw, NATO is a tested and combat effective alliance with the U.S. 
Army at its heart.  Unlike in Korea, the U.S. Army and NATO units were not supposed to 
integrate at the regiment/brigade level but operate as unique divisions.  Only at Corps and 
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higher levels did U.S. forces combine with other NATO units.
52
  The 1952 Cold War phrase 
attributed to Lord Ismay described the purpose of NATO, “Keep the Russians out, keep the 
Americans in, and the Germans down.”53  In this regard, the Korean War ensured the U.S. 
Army stayed and helped build NATO into a formidable political and military alliance. 
        Ridgway wrote in 1956: 
It was my task to overcome… the ancient hatreds and mistrusts that had rent 
Europe for a thousand years; to mold the fighting force of thirteen nations into 
one great organization for the defense of freedom… Mine was to get them 
[Europeans] to do what they promised to do… to collect on these I.O.U.’s 
these pledges to provide men and guns, planes and tanks, and money, for a 
European defensive force.
54
   
 
Minor changes were made to the U.S. Army CGSC Program of Instruction in August 1950 
that included almost doubling the number of hours spent on other militaries, from eight to 
fourteen.  The additional hours focused on an introduction to the French military system into 
the 1201 instruction hour course.
55
  By 1954, these classes on friendly militaries were no 
longer broken down into just British and French but were renamed Military Forces of Other 
Nations, and lasted 19 of 1231 academic hours in CGSC.
56
  All U.S. Army service schools 
increased the number of foreign students in the 1950’s.  Bringing foreign students to U.S. 
military schools continued throughout the Cold War and into the present day under the 
Security Assistance Training Program currently managed by the U.S. Army Training and 
Doctrine Command.
57
  The U.S. Army decided that the easiest way to train other armies was 
the same way it trained Americans.  U.S. Army manuals were translated into numerous 
languages and used as the basis of instruction when U.S. advisors taught other armies.   
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        Similar to the Romans and British before them, the U.S. Army tried to turn other armies 
into local versions of the U.S. Army.  The training and equipping of U.N. contingents at the 
U.N. Reception Center in Korea accelerated this method for organizing, training and 
equipping other militaries.  All non-Commonwealth U.N. units were eventually organized in 
accordance with U.S. T/O&E.  Most U.N. units were battalion size and used T/O&E 7-95 
(Separate Battalion), in the case of the Philippine Battalion Combat Team T/O&E 7-15 
(Battalion Combat Team) was used, and the Turkish Brigade used T/O&E 7-11N 




        With respect to coalition warfare, the U.S. Army continued to change and adapt 
throughout the Korean and performed its duty as the coalition leader in war and peace from 
the first shots of the Korean War to the present.  Although NATO was created before the 
Korean War began, not until 19 December 1950, six months after the start of the Korean 
War, did Eisenhower become Supreme Allied Commander in Europe.
59
  He was tasked to 
build a unified military headquarters and turn the concept of the NATO treaty into a force in 
being.
60
  U.S. Army soldiers continued to work with allies throughout the Cold War.  
Coalition and Multi-national formations became the U.S. Army method of choice to conduct 
military operations, even without a doctrine, throughout the Cold War.
61
  The U.S. Army 
trained its allies and worked with them as if they were Americans. 
 
KMAG and the Building of the Republic of Korea Armed Forces 
        Similar to working with coalition partners, working with host nation partners became a 
necessity for the U.S. Army during and after the Korean War.  Through the deployment of a 
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small number of U.S. Army trainers, the Korean Military Assistance Group (KMAG) was 
able to multiply the number of capable ROKA troops able to fight against communist forces. 
From 1950-1953, every branch of the U.S. Armed Forces trained a counterpart in the 
Republic of Korea Armed Forces.  Each branch of service trained and developed their Korean 
counterpart in their own way and patterns for creating an armed force from scratch 
emerged.
62
  The Eighth Army, through KMAG, led the way and established schools to train 
Korean soldiers, sailors, airmen and marines.  Once units were formed, equipment fielded, 
and individual training completed, an advisory unit would mentor the new Korean unit.  Then 
the Korean unit was attached to a U.S. Army unit and would operate under the command of 
that unit for a test period.
63
  Once the ROKA unit was combat tested a liaison element would 
remain with the unit after it took its place on the line and joined a ROKA division.
64
 
        In 1950, before the Korean War began, KMAG was a 500 man unit focused mainly on 
ROKA development and counterinsurgency. The ROKA was designed with enough 
capability and capacity to defend its border and quell insurgency but nothing more.
65
  As the 
war progressed and the lines stabilized, Van Fleet saw it as his primary task to create a larger 
and more capable ROKA.  His goal was to create ROKA units capable enough to occupy the 
majority of the MLR and replace American and U.N. troops.  In a post-conflict environment, 
the ROKA was required to fend off any future CPVF/KPA surprise attack once U.N. forces 
were re-deployed.
66
  To accomplish these tasks, KMAG grew from 500 men into an 
organization of 1,953 men who trained, advised, and assisted the creation of a 590,911 man, 
twenty divisions, ROKA.
67
  To accomplish the task, the ROKA required funds, equipment 
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and, most important, capable trainer/advisors that could work with their Korean partners.  Of 
the three elements Van Fleet needed to build the ROKA, he was deficient in all three.   
        It is hard to imagine that building the ROKA was not the number one priority of the 
DoD and Department of State.  The U.S. Army was focused on several major endeavors, the 
Korean War being the most violent but not the most important.
68
  Rearming Europe and 
building the U.S. Seventh Army was the number one priority of the Army.  During the 
Korean War sixteen Military Assistance Advisory Commands (MAAGs) spread out across 
the free world.  Each MAAG focused on training and equipping a different ally to confront 
communism.
69
  If an officer, usually a combat veteran from Korea, served as an advisor he 
had many options.  To serve in the ROK again, possibly getting shot, while living in 
substandard conditions, was not as appealing as advising the re-building of the Belgium and 
Luxemburg armed forces as part of MAAG BELLUX.   
        To build the ROKA, Van Fleet supervised the increase of KMAG from 500 to almost 
2,000 soldiers before he left Korea in February 1953.  To build KMAG, he took combat 
tested NCOs and officers off the line and rotated them into KMAG positions.
70
  This solution, 
bringing combat soldiers to serve as members of KMAG, had several benefits. First, the 
officer or soldier coming off the line was a proven quantity and understood combat in Korea.  
Second, bringing them from the line after serving six or eight months was an incentive 
because they would finish their tour in relative safety at the ROK training center at Kwanju.
71
   
Third, the point system off the line was much slower and KMAG would retain an officer or 
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soldier for a longer duration.
72
  But there were also several deficiencies with this plan.  The 
biggest problem was a lack of trained trainers.  The other glaring deficiency was the deficit of 
Korean language skills.  These challenges were mostly overcome through the use of 
interpreters and on the job training, where a trainer would start out as an assistant and after a 
cycle of training move up to become the primary instructor.
73
  
        In dealing with the funding and equipment issue, the KMAG commanders, Syngman 
Rhee and Van Fleet worked constantly to convince FEC, the U.S. Army and the JCS of the 
need to expand the ROK armed forces.  They argued that the ROK Armed Forces were a 
good long-term investment; they would save American lives and cost less than sending 
Americans to fight in Korea.
74
   
        By the end of 1952, Van Fleet, with the support of Clark, convinced the JCS to continue 
to expand the ROK Armed Forces.
75
  President Eisenhower agreed to increase the ROKA to 
twenty combat divisions with additional increases to the ROK Air Force and Navy in 1953.
76
  
The re-establishment of the Korean Military Academy (KMA) with support from the U.S. 
Military Academy at West Point created the foundation for a future professional officer 
corps.  This was coupled with the creation of a consolidated group of branch schools under 
the ROK Replacement Training and School Command (RTSC) that focused on training 
soldiers and officers in military technical skills.  The Korean Army Training Center (KATC) 
at Kwangju established the infrastructure for conducting unit level training within the ROKA.  
Under the initial leadership of Colonel Champeny and then General Ryan these schools and 
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facilities continued the U.S. Army’s practice of training other armies the way it trained 
Americans.
77
   
        As Clark wrote in 1954, “We must, when necessary, develop Asian armies to fight 
shoulder-to-shoulder with our men in battles against Communist aggression.”78  This 
understanding extended into the systems Eighth Army created within the Korean Armed 
Forces.  In Ridgway’s 22 July 1951 reply to the Department of the Army request for an 
estimate on what was needed to build a competent and effective ROKA, he made it clear that 
the ROKA needed to become similar to the ideal of the U.S. Army, based on the West Point 
motto of Duty, Honor & Country.  He also outlined a nine-point plan focused on individual, 
collective, unit and leadership training supervised through KMAG.
79
   
        The impetus behind the effort to build the ROK Armed Forces is often credited to 
General Van Fleet.  Both of his superiors, Ridgway and Clark, gave him the lion share of the 
credit for prioritizing the training and expansion of the ROKA.
80
  Part of this process 
included select officers who attended military schools in the U.S. mostly to the Infantry 
School and the Artillery School.  Starting in 1951 the number of students attending these 
schools steadily increased.  In 1952, several batches of 250 ROKA officers attended the 
Infantry and Artillery Schools.
81
  To augment the KATC, which provided basic training, Van 
Fleet directed the creation of Field Training Command (FTC).  FTC created four camps 
where ROKA Divisions rotated into Corps reserve and would go through nine weeks of unit 
refresher training.
82
  FTC focused on individual, squad, platoon, company and battalion level 
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  The honing of these skills through hands on training and numerous live 
fire exercises increased the lethality and competence of ROKA units. 
        When the U.N. forces began to withdraw in 1955, the ROKA possessed twenty fully 
equipped divisions with their full complement of artillery, tanks, and technical units.
84
  The 
Korean Military Academy and Korean Command and Staff College were fully operational 
and supported by their U.S. Army counterparts.  Most important, KMAG remained in Korea 
to continue to mentor and develop the ROK Armed Forces.
85
  The experience in Korea made 
it clear to the U.S. Army that in future limited wars they would depend on local troops to 
carry much of the burden.  This was a crucial element of the revised Eisenhower doctrine of 
1957.
86
   
        The use of military advisors became an essential operational concept of the U.S. Army 
in engaging and containing communist expansion.  Clark wrote about the need to train and 
equip the free nations of Asia and not let their potential capability “dissipate.”  He stated:  
Our American men would have to fight in any big test between communism 
and freedom…as in Korea, their ranks would have to be bolstered with men of 
other nations so that the manpower advantage the Communists have would be 
greatly reduced…I am merely pointing out that there are available vast 
numbers of men in free nations who can fight, are willing to fight and who 
fight at much less cost than do our American soldiers.  These men must be 
prepared in great numbers by the free world to take their places in the war of 




        Van Fleet supported this idea through the report he produced at the request of 
Eisenhower in 1954.
88
  Eisenhower called him back to service and sent him to assess the 
situation in Asia with respect to the status of U.S. and local forces.  His report focused on the 
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U.S. advisor program and the planned development of the Republic of Korea, Japan, Formosa 
and the Philippines as part of U.S. defense policy.  Only in the case of Japan did Van Fleet 
not recommend an expansion or maintenance of the current advisor program.
89
  Before he 
went on this mission for Eisenhower, Van Fleet wrote an article for Readers Digest 
advocating the buildup of local forces as a cheaper and more effective alternative to the 
deployment of U.S. forces.
90
  Eisenhower supported these ideas and most of Van Fleets’ 
report was enacted.  Commenting on the article in a letter to W. Bedell Smith, Eisenhower 
wrote that “I must say that I agree with his main argument completely.” Smith replied, “Like 
you, I agree with General Van Fleet’s main argument completely and I doubt he has 
exaggerated very much.”91  In the spring of 1956, Van Fleet spoke to the Advanced Infantry 
Officer Course at Fort Benning and expanded on his ideas with respect to training the armies 
of free world nations fighting communism. 
We should advise and equip the soldiers of those nations who are willing to 
fight to retain their freedom.  This advisory service is difficult, dirty, and not 
well rewarded.  However, it is vital.  We should not, in any circumstance, fight 




        This was one of the major operational concepts followed by the Eisenhower 
administration despite the rhetoric about Mutually Assured Destruction.  Korea was not the 
first time advisors were used.  But it, along with the experience in Greece, demonstrated the 
ability of local forces to shoulder much of the burden in defending themselves.  These nations 
needed properly trained, equipped, and supported forces from the U.S. Army.  In Korea, the 
roughly 2,000 KMAG advisors helped build one of the world’s largest and most capable 
armies while engaged in battle.  At the end of the fighting, the ROKA held two-thirds of the 
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MLR and proved it could fight and hold outnumbered against a massed CPVF assault, if 
supported by U.S. Army advisors and firepower.  The deployment of a few hundred advisors 
to help a country fight against communist aggression proved a useful tactic in a world of 
limited war.  The U.S. Army, through its actions, decided it was cheaper to advise and equip 
local forces than to commit large numbers of U.S. Army forces, Viet Nam being the 
exception.  In most instances this continued throughout the Cold War.  The burden of 




Chapter 6: Conclusion 
General Van Fleet focused Eighth Army on conducting operations he was authorized to 
conduct.  Constant patrolling and intensive small unit live fire training kept his force combat 
ready and became his calling card.  He directed extensive use of targeted artillery against 
suspected and known communist positions using every weapon system at his disposal.  With 
an expanded special operations capability, Eighth Army tormented and tied down large 
numbers of CPVF/KPA troops through the employment of over 20,000 partisans and focused 
psychological operations.
1
  Eighth Army continued to develop its coalition forces and created 
an integrated coalition army.  Through KMAG, the ROK Armed Forces went through a 
dramatic build up.  By July 1953, ROKA troops controlled two-thirds of the MLR.  These 
operational concepts, developed through trial and error, served as the tools to force the 
communists to sign the armistice. 
        The adoption of these five operational concepts – small unit tactics, fire support, special 
operations, combined operations, and building host nation capability through the employment 
of advisors – changed the way the U.S. Army fought the Korean War, and how it viewed its 
role as the shield of the free world.  Through the Korean War the U.S. Army learned to fight 
a defensive war of attrition.  These operational concepts changed Army doctrine and practice 
during and after the war, creating a U.S. Army focused on defending both Europe and Asia.  
Officially the U.S. Army claimed not to learn anything from the Korean War.
2
  Despite these 
statements, the U.S. Army conducted a total review of its training and doctrine that resulted 
in a new primary doctrine in 1954, FM 100-5 Operations (1954), and supporting manuals that 
specifically dealt with the new doctrinal concept “limited war.”3  The U.S. Army conducted a 
decade (1954-1962) of organizational experimentation and weapons development after the 
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Korean War that resulted in not one but two major reorganizations of the Army division, and 
fielded an array of weapon systems that included the M-14 rifle, M-16 rife, M-72 grenade 
launcher, M-60 medium machine gun, the UH-1 and CH-47 helicopter series, M-113 APC, 
and numerous other weapon systems.
4
  The U.S. Army that emerged from the Korean War 
was better trained, organized, and equipped to fight outnumbered and under adverse 
conditions. 
        These operational concept changes owe as much to the restrictions placed on the Eighth 
Army as the enemy it fought.  Peng’s CPVF were a formidable and respected opponent.  The 
tactic of “eating sticky candy” supported by massive numbers of Chinese soldiers deployed to 
fight in Korea forced to the U.S. Army to fight in conditions it would normally avoid.  Night, 
mountain, and extreme cold operations were each considered special operations in the 1949 
and 1954 Army Operations manuals.  These were the conditions that the CPVF chose to fight 
in because they stripped away many of the U.S. Army’s advantages in fire power and 
material.  Instead of backing down, as Mao expected, the U.S. Army met the challenge and 
developed new technologies and operational concepts to counter the darkness, rugged terrain, 
and extreme cold.  As the only war where the PLA and the U.S. Army engaged in direct 
combat, the Korean War demonstrated that neither massive manpower nor superior 
technology could replace well trained and well equipped infantry soldiers.  Without 
additional equipment and training the CPVF could not break through the Eighth Army line.  
Likewise, all the artillery and close air support the Eighth Army fielded could not replace 
trained infantry units. 
        Korea and the war fought on that peninsula changed the U.S. Army and the way it 
employed its forces.  The U.S. Army learned the most from the Korean War in the Infantry 
and Field Artillery branches.  Both the Infantry and Field Artillery re-focused their efforts 
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and improved their skill sets.  Infantry training at Ft. Benning focused on training 
infantrymen to kill and work as a team focused on killing.  Live fire training was pushed as 
an important part of buddy team, squad and platoon development.
5
  The emphasis on 
patrolling at the Infantry School continued, and firing rates in the Viet Nam War almost 
doubled in comparison to the improvements in individual soldier firing rates during the 
Korean War from the WWII benchmark.
6
  Fire support systems continued to improve and fire 
support planning fused all fire support weapon systems.  Integration of fire support and a 
desire to maximize fires later hobbled the U.S. Army’s ability to maneuver, because it 
became fixated on attrition through the application of fire power.
7
  Precision fire support 
became a driving focus for not just the artillery arm but also the U.S. Air Force.  Laser 
guided, optically guided and GPS guided munitions proliferated in the desire for greater 
precision.  The Korean War enhanced the U.S. Army’s training of battalion and below 
infantry units and improved fire support plans designed around the unit in contact.  These 
were two operational concepts the U.S. Army was willing to officially learn, through 
doctrinal change and demonstrated operations.           
       In the field of special operations, specifically Special Forces and Psychological Warfare, 
these operational concepts remained as an enduring capability of the U.S. Army.  The 
Infantry, Armor and Field Artillery branches hesitantly accepted special operations as a 
necessary evil, but jealously guarded their best junior officers and NCOs and discouraged 
them from walking over the fence to join special operations units.  The employment of 
Special Forces went from an anomaly to the preferred initial entry operational concept for the 
U.S. Army.  The secret buildup of 1
st
 Special Forces Group on Okinawa in 1956 and 
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activation in 1957 balanced the global footprint of U.S. Special Forces.  10
th
 Group remained 
in Europe, 1
st
 Group in Asia and 7
th
 Group at Ft. Bragg prepared for world wide deployment.
8
  
After the Korean War, the employment and maintenance of special operations units as an 
essential part of the Containment strategy was solidified.  Special operations operators, in 
conjunction with their CIA counterparts, took the lead in America’s engagement with other 
militaries, and countered similar Soviet advisors and their KGB partners. Unconventional 
warfare was grudgingly accepted as an acceptable operational concept the U.S. Army would 
train, plan for, and employ, after the Korean War. 
        With respect to equipping, training and leading allies and host nation armies, the U.S. 
Army grudgingly accepted these responsibilities, but did not enthusiastically embrace them as 
part of its mission, or validate them with doctrine and supporting institutions. The U.S. Army 
expanded the MAAG program as directed by the NSC as a cost saving tactic designed to 
enhance U.S. and allied security.  In Eisenhower’s special message that accompanied his 5 
May 1953 funding request for the Mutual Defense Assistance Program: 
This amount of money judiciously spent abroad will add much more to our 
nation’s ultimate security in the world than would an even greater amount 




 Each MAAG trained and equipped their counterpart and spread U.S. Army doctrine and 
American way of war to more and more countries.  KMAG remained in Korea and continued 
the development of the ROK Armed Forces into a more formidable and professional force.
10
  
After the Korean War, NATO continued to develop but the U.S. did not create a combined 
doctrine or formalize best practice with respect to integrating allied forces.
11
  The U.S. 
Armed Forces, through regular training exchanges and exercises like REFORGER, TEAM 
SPIRIT, and COBRA GOLD worked to enhance inter-allied interoperability.  Through these 
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exercises the U.S. Armed Forces developed ways to work with each of its treaty allies, but 
never codified them into doctrine.  During the Cold War, the DoD focused its doctrinal 
energy on the development of U.S. Armed Forces Joint doctrine.
12
  The U.S. Army, during 
the Korean War, developed a set of very lethal operational concepts designed to fight limited 
defensive wars of attrition. 
       After three years of combat in Korea the U.S. Army emerged as a different institution.  
During the conflict, it learned how to fight outnumbered, outgunned, at night, and hold 
ground.  The U.S. Army claimed its doctrine was sound but its training system was not.  To 
ensure the soundness of its doctrine, the Army re-wrote all of its manuals.  To rectify this 
deficiency, the various training facilities implemented changes focused on enhancing soldier 
skills.  In 1953 & 1954 as Chief of Staff of the Army, General Ridgway fought to retain the 
balanced force built during the Korean War.
13
  The U.S. Army accepted the need to maintain 
a wide number of operational capabilities: to fight either limited or general war.
14
  This 
included infantry units proficient in small unit tactics.  It embraced the need for integrated 
fire support responsive to the infantry soldier in the furthest out-post.  Special operations 
created an official space within the U.S. Army.  It became a critical part of the U.S. Army 
and its members were the first to give their lives in America’s next major war, Viet Nam.15  
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Fighting as a coalition and the development of local armies continued as a practice but was 
never elevated to doctrine during the Cold War.  As Korean War historian William Stueck 
















                                                                                                                                                                                    
training South Vietnamese Special Forces cadre when Viet Cong mortar rounds landed near their training area 
during an exercise.  
16
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